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Abstract
Does European integration contribute to the rise of the radical right? This disserta-
tion offers three empirical contributions that aid understanding the interplay between
political integration within the European Union (EU) and the surge of the populist
radical right across Europe. The first account studies the impact that the European
Parliament (EP) elections have for the national fortune of the populist right. The find-
ings of a country fixed-effects model leveraging variation in the European electoral
cycle demonstrate that EP elections foster the domestic prospects of the radical right
when national and EP elections are close in time. The second study demonstrates that
the populist radical right cannot use the EP elections as a platform to socialise the
most impressionable voters. The results of a regression discontinuity analysis high-
light that the EP contest does not instil partisan ties to the political antagonists of
the European idea. The third study shows that anti-European integration sentiments
that existed prior to accession to the EU cast a long shadow in the present by con-
tributing to the success of contemporary populist right actors. Relying on an original
dataset entailing data on all EU accession referenda on the level of municipalities and
exploiting variation within regions, the study demonstrates that those localities that
were most hostile to the European project before even becoming part of the Union,
today, vote in the largest numbers for the radical right. In synthesis, the dissertation
approaches the relationship between two major current transformations of social re-
ality: European integration and the surge of the radical right. The results highlight
that contention around the issue of European integration provides a fertile ground for
the populist radical right, helping to activate nationalistic and EU-hostile sentiments
among parts of the European public.
viii
Contents
Preface 7
1 A Paradox of European Integration? 13
Culturally conservative mobilisation and discursive opportunities . . . . . 17
The institution of European Parliament elections by universal suffrage . . . 19
Political integration in the EU and the surge of the populist radical right . . 21
2 Do European Parliament Elections Foster Challenger Parties’ Success
on the National Level? 27
Electoral success for challenger parties in EP elections . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Domestic momentum and the effect of electoral timing . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3 The Effect of European Parliament Elections on Political Socialisation 47
First-time eligibility and electoral participation in second-order EP elections 49
Identifying the causal effect of EP elections for political socialisation . . . . 52
Data and validity of the identification strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4 The Persistence of Anti-Integration Sentiments 65
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2 CONTENTS
Public support for the EU and politicisation of European integration . . . . 68
Persistence of anti-integration attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
The effect of initial opposition on contemporary radical right support . . . 74
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5 Conclusion 81
Appendix 87
A Supplementary Material: Do European Parliament Elections Foster
Challenger Parties Success on the National Level? 87
A.1 Parties in the analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
A.2 Empirical extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
B Supplementary Material: The Effect of European Parliament Elections
on Political Socialisation 101
B.1 Countries and parties in the analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
B.2 Empirical extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
C Supplementary Material: The Persistence of Anti-Integration Senti-
ments 113
C.1 Populist radical right parties across countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
C.2 Empirical extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
List of Tables
2.1 Fixed-effects regression results of vote share in EP elections on na-
tional vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2 Fixed-effects regression results of EP electoral cycle on national vote
share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.1 Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting on interest in politics . . 56
3.2 Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting on partisan ties to chal-
lenger parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3 Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting in placebo EP elections on
interest in politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4 Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting on interest in politics (tiny
bandwidth and long-term effects) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.1 Year of EU referendum, year of most recent parliamentary election
and initial minimum and maximum share of opposition towards the
EU by country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2 Effect of initial opposition towards the EU on contemporary populist
right support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
A.1 Parties in the analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
A.2 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4 LIST OF TABLES
A.3 Marginal effects of vote share in EP elections on national vote share
conditional on EP electoral cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
A.4 Placebo test: fixed-effects regression results of vote share in national
election on EP vote share conditional on national electoral cycle . . . 95
A.5 Fixed-effects regression results of vote share in EP elections on na-
tional vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (alternative model
specifications I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A.6 Fixed-effects regression results of vote share in EP elections on na-
tional vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (alternative model
specifications II) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
B.1 Descriptive statistics of political interest across countries . . . . . . . 102
B.2 Parties in the analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B.3 Descriptive statistics of covariates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
B.4 Balance statistics between EP eligibles and EP ineligibles . . . . . . . 105
B.5 Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting on European interest in
politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
B.6 Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting in placebo EP years on
interest in European politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
B.7 Effect of EP eligibility and voting on interest in politics across different
bandwidths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
B.8 Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting on interest in politics
(matched dataset) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
B.9 Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting on partisan ties to chal-
lenger parties (alternative classification of challenger parties) . . . . . 111
C.1 Populist radical right parties across countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
C.2 Number of regions and number of votes per country . . . . . . . . . 115
C.3 Effect of initial opposition towards the EU on contemporary populist
right support (bootstrap) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
List of Figures
2.1 Binning estimates of marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on
national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (Green parties) . 36
2.2 Marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on national vote share
conditional on EP electoral cycle (Green parties) . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3 Binning estimates of marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on
national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (populist radical
right parties) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4 Marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on national vote share
conditional on EP electoral cycle (populist radical right parties) . . . 39
2.5 Binning estimates of marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on
national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (populist radical
left parties) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.6 Marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on national vote share
conditional on EP electoral cycle (populist radical left parties) . . . . 41
4.1 Distribution of initial opposition towards the EU across countries . . 72
4.2 Deviation of municipality level populist right vote share and initial
opposition towards the EU from respective regional mean. . . . . . . 73
4.3 Structure of the data: municipality level and regions (Poland). Stan-
dardised raw data and standardised deviation from the regional mean
of initial opposition towards the EU (region-fixed effects). . . . . . . . 74
6 LIST OF FIGURES
A.1 Semi-parametric estimates of marginal effect of vote share in EP elec-
tions on national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (populist
radical left parties) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A.2 Semi-parametric estimates of marginal effect of vote share in EP elec-
tions on national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (Green
parties) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
A.3 Semi-parametric estimates of marginal effect of vote share in EP elec-
tions on national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (populist
radical right parties) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
A.4 Placebo test: binning estimates of marginal effect of vote share in na-
tional election on EP vote share conditional on national electoral cycle
(populist radical right parties) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
A.5 Placebo test: marginal effect of vote share in national election on
EP vote share conditional on national electoral cycle (populist radical
right parties) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
B.1 Mean deviation of actual number of respondents coming of age from
expected value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
B.2 Coefficient plot of effect of first-time placebo EP eligibility and voting
on interest in politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Preface
At the core of this dissertation lies the interest to understand the interplay between
two major current transformations of social reality – political integration within the
European Union and the surge of the populist radical right across European member
states. The dissertation is an attempt to unwrap the potential effects that the Euro-
pean project had for the surge of the radical right, while unintended in nature, yet
potentially favourable for the rise of these antagonists of the European project. It is
an attempt to understand to what extent the European idea has potentially fuelled
those nationalistic sentiments that it aspired to leave behind as part of its dark past.
The years of writing this dissertation (2015 – 2019) were ones of political ruptures
and uncertainty for many European countries. The final words of this dissertation are
written only three months ahead of the ninth round of European Parliament (EP) elec-
tions. It is still unclear whether the United Kingdom, as part of the European Union
at the time of the supranational elections, will convey these elections. Following the
outcome of the British referendum in June 2016 and the decision to withdraw Euro-
pean Union membership, the future of the country’s relationship with the EU is still
uncertain. It is more certain, however, that populist radical right parties will perform
outspokenly well in the upcoming EP elections within many of the European coun-
tries.
There is, of course, no lack of empirical and theoretical accounts on the surge
of the radical right across Europe and even less so on the political integration of the
European Union. This dissertation contributes to the vast body of existing studies by
contending that the progressing level of European integration has offered populist
8  PREFACE
radical right actors a particularly fruitful opportunity to make their core demands
publicly salient and to gain political visibility when mobilising citizens based on one
of their principal causes: the protection of national identity in times of an ever greater
ethnic plurality within European member states and in times of their ever growing
exposure to cultural and economic globalisation. This works to accentuate their elec-
toral prospects particularly at such moments in time in which European issues are
salient in domestic discourse and works to magnify their electoral fortune among
such parts of Europe that carry deeply entrenched EU-hostile sentiments.
Developing the conceptual framework of this dissertation, Chapter 1 draws at-
tention to the antagonistic nature of political integration within the EU, designed to
constrain aggressive nationalism across Europe, and the surge of the populist right,
which, in contrast to the original objectives of European integration, has arguably
largely benefitted from the supranational enterprise. I contend that the European
project offers a multitude of opportunity structures for the populist radical right from
an ideological, discursive and institutional perspective. As part of a broader set of
culturally conservative and nationalistic demands, the issue of European integration
belongs to the core ideology of the radical right. Carrying a highly technical, com-
plex and abstract character, the issue of European integration further lends itself well
for the discursive strategies of the populist radical right. In addition to these two as-
pects that offer chances for to radical right to successfully mobilise against further
European integration, the EP direct elections by universal suffrage offer a favourable
institutional opportunity structure. Chapter 2 argues that populist radical right actors
gain momentum in EP elections and offers a comparative empirical account of the im-
pact of the supranational elections for the national electoral fortune of challenger
parties. Chapter 3 studies whether the EP elections, which by design augment the
electoral prospects for the populist right, instil partisan bonds to those parties among
impressionable voters. Chapter 4, finally, investigates the historical antecedents of
EU hostility. It asks whether anti-integration sentiments that are independent from
any disenchantment with the suprainstitutional structure, the technocratic character
of policy-making, or the workings of European politics also function as a correlate of
radical right success, acting as a reminder that we should not readily conclude that
widespread popular resentment evident in radical right success testifies a failure of
the European idea.
Understanding the interplay between these two major transformations of social
reality across Europe, political integration within the EU and the surge of the populist
radical right, is a pressing social concern in times when policy-makers and scholars
alike are looking to grasp the roots of popular resentment, in times when political
9commentators and journalists are trying to understand the long-run implications of
the current crises for the European project, in times when citizens’ commitment to
a liberal democratic conception of European nation states appears to be fading. The
questions addressed in this dissertation, therefore, may be of current concern and in-
terest to an audience that extends beyond a small circle of social scientists. Just as
wide an audience might be searching for answers to these questions, however, just as
difficult, at times, it appears to even accurately describe, capture and document the
variety and multilayeredness of political challenges that European societies are facing.
Trying to provide answers to these questions, it appears, comes with an ever greater
responsibility for caution and an ever greater responsibility to refrain from drawing
conclusions too hastily when we cannot disentangle cause and effect, when coun-
terfactuals reach beyond the limits of our imagination, or when social reality is too
complex to be condensed into a linear function. Trying to provide answers to these
questions, it appears to me, comes with an ever greater responsibility for methodolog-
ical consciousness, a nuanced understanding of the shortcomings of a given method-
ological technique over another and a recognition and appreciation of the limits of
gaining statistical and causal inference. Therefore, the three empirical chapters of
this doctoral dissertation have carefully tried to rely on data, designs and methods
that are adequate and appropriate in the study of the questions at stake. While the
discussions of the choices of these designs and methods, at times, may appear overly
lengthy or technical to the reader, they are a reflection of my consciousness of the
aforementioned challenges and of my attempts to contribute to the study of these so-
cially relevant questions within the given limits and boundaries of gaining inference
in the field of social sciences.
This doctoral thesis should also be situated in a wider context of changing norms
within the social sciences. It is written in times in which the social sciences are con-
fronted with serious shortcomings of academic practice. These are not only rooted in
academic misconduct and serious violations of research ethics. They are also rooted
in an academic day-to-day research practice that does not rely on an infrastructure ca-
pable of reproducing the respective results. Acknowledging the importance of these
debates from a computational, statistical and an ethical point of view, I have tried to
contribute to the spreading of these norms by generating three reproducible empirical
accounts and a reproducible dissertation written in R Bookdown (Xie 2018), relying
on the R language and the related open source programming environment R (R Core
Team et. al. 2019) for the statistical analyses and on R Markdown and the knitr pack-
age to integrate the statistical analyses into the actual reporting and presentation on
the results.
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CHAPTER 1
A Paradox of European Integration?
”Why has the European concept lost a lot of its force and initial impetus?
I believe that over the years the European public has lost a guiding light,
namely the political consensus between our countries on our reasons for
undertaking this joint task and the characteristics with which we wish
to endow it. We must first of all restore this common vision if we wish to
have European Union. The European idea is partly a victim of its own successes.”
(Tindemans 1975, p. 3)
Europe was built on the grounds of the fundamental promise to secure peace among
its citizens. The European project was an attempt to bring to an end the bloody and
traumatic conflicts that had divided its citizens. European integration was a moral
imperative understood to prevent the resurgence of nationalistic sentiments within
the nation states, a moral imperative understood to hold sway over those forces that
had given urgent rise to supranational cooperation, a moral imperative understood
to tame and constrain the aggressive nature of nationalism. As the founders of the
European community laid out most prominently in the preamble of the Treaty Con-
stituting the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), European integration was
an ambition to create a ‘common destiny’ among the people of Europe.
Conceptions of a common destiny and a common European futuremay have long
lost their narrative power in legitimising integration efforts as sorrowfully noted by
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a visionary European enthusiasts as early as in 1975 – at a time when the European
Union (EU) was only to become political reality for most countries across Europe.1
Conceptions of a common destiny and a common European future, however, have
never been so profoundly shaken up in their entirety as they are shaken up today,
they have never been called into question with such irrevocable consequences for
the European idea as they are called into question today, they have never been rein-
terpreted so drastically to be a threat more than a prospect for European citizens as
they are reinterpreted today by nascent political actors who are determined to put a
forceful end to the European project.
Across all parts of Europe, populist radical right actors have gained electoral
grounds.2 Not too rarely, their electoral success seems to have its origins in the Euro-
pean elections, which appears paradoxical in view of the original objectives of Euro-
pean integration. Put in the spotlight of public attention, these EU opponents attack
the commitment to widen and deepen political, economic and social integration, call-
ing long-standing established norms regarding a shared European future into question
and challenging those principles that used to define the European spirit. While Eu-
ropean integration had always been contentious in the struggles of a continuously
widening and deepening following the crafting of the Rome treaties and the absence
of a popular European spirit has a long history (Sternberg 2013; Commission 1973),
it appears that the scope of current contestation has reached an unprecedented level
(de Vries 2018, p.35). Until recently, disputes used to revolve rather around the ‘how’
of further integration. European delegates used to quarrel over the power distribu-
tion among the supranational institutions. Critics used to call in question the pace of
the enlargement and expansion of the European Union. National executives used to
fight about the need for European political symbolism. This is the case no longer. Dis-
putes, it appears, have reached perilous grounds for the European idea. What used to
be unconceivable until recently has become part of social reality, or even normality,
in many member states and in every single one of the six EU foundation members:
political actors campaign on the grounds of ‘whether’ to advance European integra-
tion. The decision of British citizens to leave the Union has further stoked fears that
the Union has started to disintegrate (e.g. Jones 2018; Rosamond 2016). The prevailing
norms governing the playing field on how to debate the future of Europe seem to have
been lastingly affected: the ‘whether’ is no longer a political taboo. Disenchantment
with the workings of European politics seems to have fuelled ‘exclusive nationalism’
(Hooghe and Marks 2005; Risse 2015) across the member states, even more so at a
time when the supranational project cannot maintain to deliver the previous positive
levels of economic growth (Hooghe and Marks 2018; Polyakova and Fligstein 2016).
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Over the course of the European financial crisis and the following influx of large num-
bers of asylum seekers, the issue of European integration became only more heavily
contested, exposing the technocratic character of its institutions, laying bare the va-
rieties of democratic decision-making deficits and lending the bureaucrats’ appeals
to a common European identity in the view of some citizens an elitist, utopian char-
acter, thereby ultimately exacerbating the confrontational lines between those who
are ready to appreciate the cultural and economic benefits resulting from political
integration and those who lack the capabilities to do so.
In parallel to the saliency of issues related to European integration rose also the
support for those party actors who most vehemently call for a return to the nation
state as to regain authoritative power over key policy decisions. It appears that the
European project has nurtured its own backlash, having acted as a catalyst for exactly
those radical sentiments that it aimed to overcome: nationalism is back in vogue. The
most serious threat to the future of the European project, today, seems to lie within
the Union, which truly appears like a paradox. Did the supranational project fuel
the ascendency of those anti-integrationist and nationalistic political forces which
the European idea exactly aspired to leave behind as part of a its dark past? Did
the populist radical right gain from the character of the supranational elections and
the discursive opportunities created by the technocratic nature of decision-making in
Brussels? Did the rapidly progressing integration and the efforts to socially engineer
Europe3 propagate feelings of a loss of national identity among citizens?
The present dissertation offers an empirical account tackling these question from
complementary angles: Chapter 2 studies the particular impact of the supranational
elections, the possibly most ambitious institutional project created by European polit-
ical elites that has sparked the potentially greatest disenchantment regarding its real-
world performance and has repeatedly facilitated the fortune of the populist right in
these elections. The analysis shows that the supranational contest offers populist radi-
cal right actors an opportunity tomake their core demands publicly salient and to gain
national visibility when articulating their demands against further integration. Chap-
ter 3 shows that the reasons for the success of this mobilisation strategy, however,
lie not in the fact that the elections lastingly socialise voters into radical right parti-
sans. Evidently, the supranational contest per se does not instil lasting partisan bonds
to anti-European forces. Echoing the argument that the mobilisation of the radical
right is successful rather because of an increased public salience of culturally conser-
vative demands, chapter 4 shows that initial hostility towards the EU, which predates
membership, strongly predicts current populist radical right success. It investigates
whether pre-existing hostility towards the EU, which is independent from a potential
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disenchantment with the suprainstitutional structure, the technocratic character of
policy-making, or the elitist nature of decision-making in Brussels, also works as a
correlate of radical right success. To understand whether such hostility towards the
EU likewise relates to the contemporary success of radical right actors is critical as it
helps to delineate the limits of responsibility that can possibly be attributed to the EU
for having nurtured the ascendency of the greatest antagonists of the European idea.
In synthesising the main empirical findings, chapter 5 contends that political integra-
tion within the European Union and the surge of the radical right across Europe are to
be understood as correlates of larger, structural processes of societal transformation
unfolding across Europe that carry a globalising or de-nationalising character. These
structural processes work to heighten the salience of culturally conservative policy de-
mands like the populist radical right’s antagonism towards European integration. The
inevitably increasing saliency and concreteness of questions of European integration
coupled with the considerable complexity and abstractness of European politics has
arguably provided an extremely fertile ground for the populist radical right, helping
to activate and exacerbate nationalistic, anti-integrationist and EU-hostile sentiments
among parts of the European public.
Beforemoving to the empirical studies of this dissertation, in the following, I offer
a comprehensive framework to understand the impact of political integration within
the European Union for the rise of the radical right. I first discuss that the issue of
European integration and opposition towards the EU overlap with other substantive
demands of the radical right related to culturally conservative policies. These policy
demands have become an important dimension of party competition across Europe
thanks to long-term processes of structural transformations of political conflict. I
further contend that the complex and abstract character of technocratic multi-level
governance in the EU offers a favourable discursive opportunity structure that aligns
with the rhetorical, anti-elitist style of the radical right.
I then move to engage with a third beneficial opportunity created by European
integration, which will play a central role in the empirical designs of chapter 2 and 3:
the institution of EP direct elections. I situate this particular institution along with its
peculiar characteristics within both the history of European integration and the schol-
arly engagement with this political institution, which is critical as to grasp the nature
of this political institution that, by construction, offers very favourable conditions for
the success of the radical right. I contend that due to the simultaneous organisation
of the EP elections across member states this institution is particularly well suited
to study the effects it entails for domestic party competition and voting behaviour,
which has not yet been appreciated by most existing accounts that have rather been
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concerned with understanding the character of the European contest more than its
resulting consequences.
Culturally conservative mobilisation and discursive
opportunities
To comprehend the potential impact of political integration within the EU for the
rise of the radical right, it is first critical to understand that anti-European stances
form a coherent set of culturally conservative policy demands together with other
nationalistic and anti-immigration proposals. Therefore, anti-European stances serve
the substantive demands that populist radical right actors advance as part of their
ideological and programmatic proposals.
Over the last decades, accelerating processes of economic, political and cultural
globalisation have contributed to the opening-up of national boundaries, which has
affected citizens’ lives and living conditions across Europe in different ways. Some
citizens feel they benefit from this opening-up of national boundaries and generally
appreciate the opportunities that international integration and globalisation creates
for them. Other citizens, in contrast, feel they lose from this opening-up of national
boundaries and perceive of the changes generated by international integration and
globalisation more as a risk to them personally and their environment more generally
(Kriesi et al. 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2018). This conflict has mostly been empha-
sised and mobilised by non-mainstream political actors and has contributed to the
emergence of populist radical right challenger parties, who incite public and polit-
ical discourse about the extent to which national borders should be permeated by
flows of capital, goods or people from foreign countries (Zürn and de Wilde 2016;
Kriesi and Hutter 2019; Mudde 2016). Arguing that such capital, good and migration
flows present a threat to the national identity, the national culture and the national
traditions of their respective state, they advocate a return to national authoritative
power over key decisions in these matters. A number of scholars argue that these
discourses and political debates tend to occur along a ‘new’, cultural dimension of
political conflict that is distinct from the traditional left-right dimension of politics.
This new cleavage has been called the ‘integration-demarcation’ (Kriesi et al. 2008),
‘GAL-TAN’ (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002), or ‘universalism-communitarianism’
cleavage (Bornschier 2010) and cuts across left-right ideological loyalties. The issue of
European integration is to be situated as one of the political issues that pertains to the
new cleavage (e.g. Inglehart and Reif 1991). Issues of supranational integration are de-
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bated in close connection to other issues pertaining to cultural or identitarian politics,
like the issue of immigration, the ‘twin issue’ of European integration (Hoeglinger
2016; van der Brug and van Spanje 2009).
In addition to aligning well with their principal substantive demands for cultur-
ally conservative and identitarian policies from an ideological point of view, questions
of European integration, secondly, also lend themselves well for the discursive strate-
gies and the rhetorical style of the populist radical right in carrying a very technical,
complex and abstract character. Owing to the nature of technocratic policies imple-
mented on the European level, to the complex decision-making structure in the multi-
level framework of governance and to the elitist character of European bureaucracy
in Brussels remote from the everyday lives of citizens, the supranational project is an
ideal target for the discourse advanced by the populist radical right. It is sufficiently
abstract, sufficiently unpoliticised bymost mainstream parties and sufficiently encom-
passing with respect to the range of policy fields concerned as to offer a multitude of
chances for broad political mobilisation against the EU.
European policy-making has a history of creating perceptions of abstract remote-
ness among citizens. In the early phases of European integration, the often complex
decisions taken at the European level did also hardly touch upon citizens’ everyday
lives in a visible, perceptible way (Wallace and Smith 1995). This has changed at
least in the wake of the debates about the introduction of a common European cur-
rency (Risse 2003). The multi-level governance in the EU, however, has largely main-
tained its technocratic character (Caramani 2017) and policy-making often leads to
procedural agreement among the EU members, which is conflicting with the style of
policy-making envisoned by the populist right (Bornschier 2010, p. 29). The recent
experience of the financial crisis across Europe has only entrenched this perception
of elitist, technocratic EU decision-making and the level of technical complexity re-
lated to these multi-level decision-making processes has further grown (Offe 2015;
Schimmelfennig 2018; Henning 2017).
This offers a favourable opportunity for the discourse of populist radical right
actors who appeal to voters by emphasising an anti-elitist political style of decision-
making that aims to relocate control in the hands of citizens and in the realm of the
nation state. The increasing saliency and concreteness of questions of European inte-
gration in the everyday reality of citizens coupled with the considerable complexity of
decision-making in Brussels provides a beneficial discursive opportunity for populist
radical right actors to portray themselves as anti-elitist, tangible political alternative
that lies within the direct reach of citizens. The encompassing range of different pol-
icy fields concerned by decisions taken on the European level further renders the issue
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of European integration sufficiently flexible to fit a broad mobilisation strategy based
on opposition towards the EU.
The institution of European Parliament elections by
universal suffrage
A third particularly promising opportunity structure for the populist radical right lies
in the institution of European direct elections: not only are pro- and anti-European
stances salient in these elections, by its nature and construction, the institution also
offers an easily accessible and permeable arena for populist radical right actors. As to
understand this specific nature of the institution and the reasons why the European
elections work to increase the electoral prospects of the populist radical right across
Europe, in the following, I briefly situate the European direct elections by universal
suffrage in the history of integration attempts on the one side and in the scholarly
engagement with this institution on the other side.
The idea of introducing direct European Parliament (EP) elections by universal
suffrage had already been part of the Treaties of Rome, but would only much later
become political reality among the nine member states at that time. The early de-
bates about the institution of European Parliament elections revolved around the cen-
tral assumption that a direct legitimisation of the Members of European Parliament
(MEPs) would spark greater power of the assembly vis-à-vis the other European in-
stitutional bodies. The majority of members of the Commission concerned with the
‘Draft Convention for the Introduction of European Direct Elections by Universal Suf-
frage’ largely endorsed the idea. The institution of direct elections seemed to consti-
tute the missing puzzle as to complete the creation of a supranational political regime.
Adding this missing piece of the puzzle to the broader picture of European integration,
so the proponents believed, would inevitably set in motion an effortless, enduring and
continuously evolving progress of further integration, working to ‘impart a strong
impetus to the spiritual integration of Europe’ (Committee on Political Affairs 1960),
designed to prevail throughout the future of the European continent.
Their visionary ideas about the direct elected governing body, however, would
only materialise much later in the political reality of the supranational institutional
structure owing to the initial passivity of the European Council in responding to the
Draft proposal (Lodge 1973, p. 63). Consequentially, the so-called ‘Parliamentary As-
sembly’ would remain an indirectly elected body, composed of national delegates that
held a national political mandate, for more than fifteen years after the early debates.
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Only in 1979, the first European direct elections were conveyed across the then nine
member states.4 Since these first direct elections in 1979, the timing of the direct elec-
tions is set to be the same across all member states with a stable electoral cycle of five
years.5 To date, there have been no deviations from this electoral cycle and every sin-
gle EU member state has participated in every round of the EP elections. In particular
thanks to this fixed electoral cycle, the supranational institution carries a somewhat
exogenous character with respect to national party competition, that makes it particu-
larly well suited to study the effects of European political integration for the potential
surge of the radical right, a point which will be important in chapter 2.
Since the onset of this supranational political ‘experiment’, the EP elections have
received large amounts of scholarly attention, set in motion by the seminal piece pub-
lished by Reif and Schmitt (1980), only a year after the first supranational electoral
contest. Drawing on theoretical ideas proposed by a less well-known German scholar
Reiner Dinkel and his take on the relationship between electoral outcomes in the Ger-
man multi-level system conditional on the timing of the respective elections (Dinkel
1977), Reif and Schmitt (1980) showed that the EP elections fell short in achieving the
same popular participation levels and that the election outcomes differed markedly
from the election outcomes observed in the previous national elections of member
states (Reif and Schmitt 1980, p. 6). They concluded that the EP elections should be
understood as secondary to the national elections, offering both voters and parties an
electoral playing field that is governed by markedly different rules and norms, cre-
ating an incentive structure that prompts markedly different voting behaviours and
campaign efforts.
The fact that national issues dominate the European campaigns may not seem
too surprising in absence of a transnational party system. To the extent that the same
national political actors contest the EP elections who also contest the respective do-
mestic contests, it can be expected that these actors campaign on the respective Euro-
pean issues, at best, with respect to their national agenda more than with respect to
a trans- or supranational agenda. Traveling back in time, the dominance of national
campaigns and national issues over European ones appears even less surprising: be-
fore the arrival of the digital era, citizens and media across Europe were also linguis-
tically, spatially and technically less interconnected as they are today (Fligstein 2008)
and, as a consequence, more occupied with the respective national issues (Downey
and Koenig 2006; Semetko et al. 2000; Schlesinger 1999). National media continue
to remain the dominant information channel transmitting European issues and issue
agendas to the different European publics, thereby contributing to the so-called ‘me-
dia deficit’ of the European project (Jakubowicz and Sükösd 2011).
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Reacting to the seminal account of Reif and Schmitt (1980), however, much of the
literature has subsequently been occupied with arguing that European campaigns are
not only and not always dominated by national issues and are instead to different de-
grees also ‘about Europe’, evident in ‘EU issue voting’ behaviour among citizens (We-
ber 2009; de Vries et al. 2011). The scholarly debate about the national vs. European
character of the EP elections was clearly facilitated by broad data availability paving
theway for related academic controversies. Electoral data related to the EP elections is
per definitionem comparative in nature and survey items related to voting behaviour in
the EP elections could conveniently be compared across a range of countries. The (pos-
sibly misleading) theoretical distinction between the European or national nature of
the EP campaigns and related voting behaviours, however, has arguably contributed
to the fact that scholars have almost exclusively been concerned to study the EP elec-
tions and related political variables as outcome variables and have tended to overlook
their consequences. A similar observation can be made regarding their potential nur-
turing consequences for the surge of the populist radical right across member states.
In light of the evidently antagonistic nature of those parties’ positions on European
integration, scholars have mostly dedicated their attention to the respective parties’
behaviour in the supranational governing body and their rather unsuccessful attempts
to form pan-European party groups (Almeida 2010; Veen 1997; Pollmann, Fennema,
et al. 1998). This dissertation, instead, aims to understand whether the EP elections
and political integration in the EU, more generally, have consequences for shaping
domestic party competition and possibly fuelling the success of the radical right.
Political integration in the EU and the surge of the
populist radical right
I have argued that Europe was built on the premise to constrain aggressive national-
ism and to prevent the resurgence of nationalistic forces. With the growing saliency
of European integration in domestic politics and with growing levels of political con-
tention around central questions related to the widening and deepening of European
integration, however, rose the success of those political forces that the European idea
aspired to overcome. As part of a broader set of culturally conservative and nation-
alistic demands, the issue of European integration belongs to the substantive core
ideology of the radical right. Moreover, carrying a highly technical, complex and ab-
stract character, questions of European integration further lend themselves well for
the discursive strategies advanced by the populist radical right. In addition to these
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two aspects that offer a variety of chances for the radical right to successfully mobilise
against further European integration, the EP direct elections by universal suffrage of-
fer a favourable institutional opportunity structure. To understand whether these
beneficial opportunities related to European integration have nurtured the rise of the
radical right across Europe, this dissertation offers three empirical accounts, which I
introduce in the following.
In chapter 2, which has been published in EuropeanUnion Politics (Schulte-Cloos
2018), I ask whether the EP elections haveworked to foster the surge of challenger par-
ties, broadly understood as non-mainstream parties, i.e. populist radical right, Green
and populist radical left parties. Condensing and integrating the various theoretical
arguments advanced within the literature on the ‘second-order’ or ‘truly European’
character of the EP elections, I arrive at the notion that all of these challenger parties
enjoy advantages in the EP elections for three reasons. First, they enjoy advantages
in EP elections because voters apply a different voting rationale in these elections. As
the elections do not lead to government formation, voters are more likely to ‘vote with
their heart’. Thus, citizens may be inclined to cast a vote that most closely matches
their policy preferences, disregarding any strategic calculations on whether their cho-
sen party will make it into government. Given that there is so little at stake in the
elections, theymay also take the elections as an opportunity to punish themainstream
parties and express their disapproval of the domestic government performance. Sec-
ond, challenger parties enjoy advantages in the EP elections because the issue of Eu-
ropean integration is more salient in the EP elections than in national elections. As
mainstream parties tend to be more pro-European than the average voter is, those
challenger parties who oppose further integration enjoy systematic advantages over
their mainstream competitors. The European direct elections offer an arena to reg-
ister discontent with the EU and to attract votes from those citizens who share this
discontent. Finally, the electoral system applied in the EP elections further helps to
augment the chances for challenger parties in European member states. Since 1995,
all member states have to apply a system of proportional representation in the supra-
national elections, rendering the electoral formula more permissive than, for instance,
the first-past-the-post system applied in the United Kingdom.
Based on these arguments, chapter 2 asks for the resulting consequences for chal-
lenger parties in national elections. It shows that the institution of EP elections has
helped to foster populist right parties’ success on the national level by increasing their
visibility and offering an opportunity structure for domestic politicisation of Europe.
Leveraging the exogenous timing of the EP elections along with the variation in na-
tional electoral cycles since 1979, I show that the event of the European elections
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augments populist right actors’ domestic electoral prospects, which is not the case
for either Green parties or populist radical left actors. The comparison with Green
and populist radical left actors can be instructive as the populist radical right is the
only challenger actor that benefits from all three different opportunities related to
European integration. Political integration within the EU offers fruitful opportunity
structures for radical right actors to articulate their nationalistic demands that belong
to their core ideology, to criticise the technocratic and complex EU policy-making
that feeds into their central anti-elitist discourse and to capitalise from the institu-
tional set-up of European direct elections. The results demonstrate that these oppor-
tunities at the European level help the populist radical right to succeed in national
elections. This is particularly the case when the national election and the European
elections fall close in time. The temporal proximity to the European contest boosts the
electoral prospects of those party actors who mobilise most fiercely against European
integration, suggesting that populist radical right actors benefit from an increased
visibility of their opposition to the supranational project. This visibility is enhanced
whenever a national election takes place in temporal proximity to a European contest.
Pointing to this unintended consequence of the direct elections that has received lit-
tle attention before, the chapter makes an innovative and original contribution to our
understanding of the implications of the supranational elections.
Chapter 3, which has been published in the Journal of European Public Policy
(Schulte-Cloos 2019), sets out to understand another effect that the EP elections may
have in lastingly affecting socio-political reality within the member states. It stud-
ies the effect that the EP elections have for the political socialisation of first-time
voters. Just like chapter 2, it departs from the notion that the electoral context of
the EP elections is structurally different from national elections: the elections do
not result in government formation and campaign and mobilisation efforts are less
pronounced than in national elections, decreasing the incentives for individuals to
participate. Strong incentives to participate in a given election are, however, particu-
larly important to mobilise first-time voters as they lack previous voting experience
or voting habits. A large body of literature shows that individuals’ first electoral par-
ticipation is relevant in setting in motion a life-long political engagement (Abramson
et al. 1998; Plutzer 2002; Franklin 2004). Considering that the characteristic voting
logic of EP elections favours non-strategic voting for challenger parties and consid-
ering that the European campaign offers political actors an opportunity to mobilise
against further integration, moreover, first-time voters may develop lasting partisan
bonds to such challenger parties (Dinas and Riera 2018; Franklin 2017). This could
contribute to fuel anti-European sentiments among the European youth. Chapter 3
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therefore investigates whether the EP elections and the structurally different electoral
context of these elections inculcate a lasting political disaffection or instil partisan ties
to anti-European challenger parties among young voters.
The study uses an innovative quasi-experimental research design that uses a
cross-national survey dataset to compare two very similar groups of young voters
coming from six different European countries. These young voters differ from each
other only with respect to whether they came of age for the EP elections. The fact that
some of the voters happen to turn eligible just before election day and some others
happen to reach legal voting age slightly later creates a natural discontinuity among
the adolescents. Half of them had the chance to participate on election day and cast
their first ever vote in the EP elections, while the other half of them did not. Based
on the precise measure of their birth dates, the identification strategy of this chap-
ter exploits the exogenous variation in first-time eligibility for the EP election. This
measure of their birth dates is available as part of a cross-national youth survey that
also entails questions on the political interest and partisan preferences of young re-
spondents. The findings of the study demonstrate that there are no adverse effects of
the European elections in generating partisan ties to anti-European parties. Instead,
political participation in the supranational contest results in a greater level of political
interest among young individuals, an effect that is substantive in its size. In addition,
the estimated effect appears to be long-lasting and can be detected among respon-
dents in the dataset more than five years after the time of their first enfranchisement
in the EP elections. The results of this study speak to a broad literature: the low-key
EP elections can be understood as a conservative test of the hypothesis that the act of
voting affects young individuals’ political interest. Many studies have convincingly
shown that individual turnout carries a habitual character (Coppock and Green 2016).
Citizens that are incentivised to participate in a given election, for instance, in a ‘Get
Out the Vote’ campaign, tend to vote in larger numbers even in consecutive elections,
suggesting that the act of voting affects certain political attitudes that are conducive
to voting. In providing cross-national and causal evidence showing that participation
in the EP elections results in a greater political interest among first-time voters, the
findings of the third chapter of this dissertation, thus, offer a mechanism that may
account for the well-documented character of the persistence of political participa-
tion. The study also shows that the elections do not entail socialisation effects with
respect to partisan identification with challenger parties. This finding is not only im-
portant in highlighting that such a potential socialisation mechanism cannot account
for the fact that the EP elections work to foster the domestic success of populist radi-
cal right actors as shown in the second chapter of the dissertation. It is also important
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in stressing that voting in the EP elections does not in itself create EU-hostile political
preferences, which in the long-run could work to undermine the prospects of further
European integration.
If not a process of socialisation through participation in the European elections
is responsible for instilling partisan ties to anti-European forces, what are, then, the
roots of anti-European attitudes among European citizens? Chapter 4 contributes to
understanding the nature and origins of anti-integration sentiments by showing that
initial hostility towards the supranational project strongly predicts current radical
right success. Relying on a novel and original dataset entailingmunicipality-level data
of all historical EU accession referenda linked to data on current populist right success
within the same geographical units, I show that mass support for anti-European forces
is rooted in a historical rejection of EUmembership. By exploiting the within-regional
variation of support for accession, the results demonstrate that those localities that
initially opposed accession to the European Union most strongly, today, show signif-
icantly higher levels of radical right success than such localities that were favourable
towards the European idea. In predating the actual exposure to membership, substan-
tive opposition towards integration appears to carry a persistent character that works
to exacerbate preferences for national demarcation. The results of the fourth chapter
of this dissertation contribute to a nascent literature on the persistence of political
attitudes within local communities.
In synthesising the empirical findings of the three empirical studies, chapter 5
concludes that political integration within the European Union and the surge of the
radical right across Europe should be understood as elements of larger, structural
transformations of European societies, which are sustained and promoted by pro-
cesses of globalisation. In approaching the complex interplay of two major aspects
of a changing social reality across Europe, European integration and the surge of the
radical right, the dissertation helps to unwrap the potential effects that the European
project had in offering a favourable opportunity structure for mobilisation against
integration.
Notes
1. After the Paris summit in December 1974, the European Council asked Belgian
Prime Minister Tindemans to specify what was meant by the term ‘European Union’,
which gave him the occasion to develop a vision on Europe in a report transmitted to
the Council in December 1975.
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2. I use the terms populist radical right and radical right interchangeably throughout
this chapter. For the respective parties included in the empirical analyses see the
Appendices A, B and C.
3. The European Council adopted, for instance, a ‘Declaration on European Identity’
as early as in 1973 (Commission 1973) and the first round of the Eurobarometer series,
understood to calibrate the success of instilling such a potential European identity,
would be run a year later in 1974. It had been an early objective of Europhile and
cosmopolitan political elites to create a ‘citizen’s Europe’ (Tindemans 1975).
4. The institution of direct elections within the framework of a politically integrated
Europe had already been enshrined in the Treaty that established the European Coal
and Steal Commonunity in 1951 (Article 21), stating that a European ‘Assembly shall
consist of delegates who shall be designated by the respective Parliaments once a year
from among their members, or who shall be elected by direct universal suffrage.’
5. It is worth to emphasise that the initial debates about the EP elections included the
policy option of using different electoral cycles, a scenario that was discussed along
with the proposal to let member states decide individually whether their European
delegates should hold a direct democratic mandate or maintain their indirect mandate.
Critics argued that such a non-uniform procedure would ‘not be conducive to the
creation of European parties and would not mobilize public opinion at a European
level’ (Vedel Report 1972).
CHAPTER 2
Do European Parliament Elections Foster Challenger
Parties’ Success on the National Level?
Only eight months after having narrowly missed the five percent threshold in the Ger-
man Federal Election in 2013, the populist right ‘Alternative für Deutschland’ (AfD)
gained more than seven percent of the German votes in the European Parliament (EP)
elections. Immediately after this success, nation-wide opinion polls reported a surge
in public support to eight percentage points, indicating that the party would pass the
national threshold if elections were to take place. Meanwhile, the ‘Sverigedemokra-
terna’ (SD) doubled their result in the Swedish ‘Riksdag’ election four months after
their unexpected success in the 2014 EP elections. Born only a couple of months prior
to the EP elections 2014, also the Spanish ‘Podemos’ movement drew crucial momen-
tum from the broad media coverage related to their European success, helping the
young party to become the third largest party in the Spanish general election a year
later.
According to the second-order elections theory (Reif and Schmitt 1980), chal-
lenger parties are likely to be successful in European elections. While the EP election
is supra-national in nature, the related campaigns still take place on the national level,
and national parties run for office in the European contests. Within each country, the
party system, media, and electorate are virtually identical in the domestic and Euro-
pean arena. Offering structural advantages to challenger parties, the institution of EP
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elections may have unanticipated consequences for national party competition (van
der Brug and de Vreese 2016). Although the literature has established that second-
order elections facilitate the success of challenger parties (Hix and Marsh 2007), it is
not fully understood how their success in the second-order arena relates to their na-
tional performance (Somer-Topcu and Zar 2014). Despite low levels of voter turnout,
the very institutional existence of the EP elections offers challenger actors a forum to
promote their policy-demands and to attract national attention.
This article argues that challenger parties gain momentum in EP elections. Build-
ing on the second-order elections theory, it posits that the EP elections foster chal-
lenger parties’ success on the national level. I test this proposition by exploiting
the variation in national electoral cycles and the quasi-exogenous timing of EP elec-
tions since 1979. The results show that particularly populist radical right parties draw
crucial momentum from the supranational contest. Their national gains are great-
est when the European and the national election are close in time. By changing the
focus from the European to the national arena, the chapter contributes to an emerg-
ing research agenda on the national implications of EP elections (van der Brug and
de Vreese 2016; Dinas and Riera 2018; Franklin 2017; Markowski 2016; Franklin and
Hobolt 2011). The study disentangles the spillover effect from alternative explanations
and sheds light on the underlying mechanisms of the spillover, establishing that: (a)
the impact of EP elections on the national fortune of the radical right does not only
stem from congruent voter preferences across governance levels; and that (b) themere
event of the EP contest benefits radical right actors when the national election is close
in time. The EP elections offer an opportunity structure for the populist right to make
their antagonism towards further integration domestically salient, potentially imper-
illing the European project.
In times of growing nationalism and the rise of populism across Europe, it is
important to understand the implications that EP elections have for challenger par-
ties’ national success. Shedding light on the mechanisms that augment the domestic
prospects of challengers, this chapter contributes to uncover the unintended, disinte-
grative consequences of the European direct elections.
Electoral success for challenger parties in EP elections
Existing research shows that challenger parties have higher chances for electoral suc-
cess in EP elections than in national elections because of: (a) the secondary character
of the EP elections; (b) their stances on Europe in their policy proposals; and (c) the
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permissiveness of the electoral system in the European arena.
First, according to the seminal second-order elections theory, challenger parties
have better prospects to succeed in EP elections since the elected representatives in the
European arena do not decide about government formation and no immediate policy-
implications accrue out of the EP result. This renders the EP elections secondary to
the national elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980; van der Eijk, Franklin, and Marsh 1996),
which bears implications for citizens’ voting rationale. Voters use the supranational
elections instrumentally to express dissatisfaction with their national governments
(Hix and Marsh 2007). Moreover, voters are likely to defect from their national party
choice due to the lack of parties’ mobilisation efforts during European campaigns
(Weber 2007). Second, the EP elections are favourable to challenger parties as some
voters engage in EU-issue voting. Those voters, in turn, are inclined to support a chal-
lenger in the EP elections since mainstream parties are commonlymore pro-European
than their average supporters are (Hobolt, Spoon, et al. 2009; Irwin 1995; Reif and
Schmitt 1997). Many radical parties have a particularly strong anti-European posi-
tion (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002), contributing to the politicisation of Europe
(Grande and Hutter 2016; Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). Considering that they are not
internally split on European stances as many mainstream parties are, they systemati-
cally perform better in EP elections (Ferrara 2004). With voters being less supportive
of European integration than mainstream political elites are, radical parties represent-
ing anti-European attitudes and making European issues salient enjoy an advantage
(van der Eijk and Franklin 2004; van Egmond 2007). Third, EP elections augment chal-
lengers’ prospects based on the proportional electoral system applied. While some of
the member states use a majoritarian electoral system nationally, as of 1999, all Euro-
pean representatives are elected proportionally. Thus, challenger parties enjoy also
‘mechanical’ advantages in European elections as opposed to some national contests
(Oppenhuis et al. 1996).
In sum, the distinct subordinated character and the salience of European policies
prompt a different voting rationale among voters who turn out in European elections.1
Many of these voters express their dissatisfaction with their national governments or
align their vote closely with their policy preference (being European, domestic, or Eu-
rosceptic in nature). For both reasons, challenger parties enjoy advantages in the EP
elections, which may be further amplified by the permissive electoral system in EP
elections. In the following, I contend that the benefits for challenger parties in the Eu-
ropean arena also boost their domestic prospects. European electoral successes may
heighten a challenger party’s visibility in the domestic arena – in particular, if the tem-
poral proximity between both elections increases the domestic salience of European
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integration.
Domestic momentum and the effect of electoral tim-
ing
I argue that challenger parties gain momentum (Holbrook 1996, p. 130; Mutz 1997)
through successful performance in EP elections. Virtually the same national parties
and major national actors contest both elections (van der Eijk and van der Brug 2007,
p. 7), even if the results in the respective elections are determined by a different voting
rationale. Therefore, competing parties and media may consider a challenger party’s
success in the EP arena an indicator for its likely next national performance. Success
of a challenger party in the second-order arena leads to increased national media
attention, a heightened domestic visibility of the party, and greater attention levels by
party elites (Oppenhuis et al. 1996, p. 302). This reaction of media and competitors is
particularly pronounced if the supranational performance has domestic significance
in potentially polarising national party competition (Vasilopoulou 2017).
A strong EP performance coupled with an increased visibility of the party may
heighten the chances that individuals vote for the party in the next national election.
Research on United States (US) primary elections shows that information on mass
support for a certain candidate does not only impact strategical vote considerations
(Zech 1975), but even evokes attitudinal change among some voters (Mutz 1997). Con-
fronted with information on high support levels for a certain candidate, so-called ‘con-
sensus cues’, individuals re-evaluate the candidate based on this information. They
rehearse their political views in light of the arguments that they deem explanatory for
the high mass support levels. Importantly, this process involves priming of the per-
ceived others’ political views and cognitive engagement with arguments that ‘would
not otherwise have come to mind’ (Mutz 1997, p. 105). After successfully competing
in the EP elections, a challenger party and its policy positions are primed in the minds
of voters.
Yet, the proposed effects presume that the EP election is cognitively available to
voters and national party actors. European politics, however, tend to take place in the
shadow of national politics (Beaudonnet and Franklin 2016). Only when the tempo-
ral distance between both elections is short, European issues enjoy some prominence
in national elections. Analysing the impact of exogenous events on EU news cov-
erage across seven EU members, Boomgaarden, Vliegenthart, et al. (2010) find that
media coverage increases strongest during the EP elections and the following installa-
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tion of a new EU commission. Rauh (2015) points towards greater levels of domestic
politicisation of EU affairs in parliamentary debates around the period of national
and European elections. The character of the EP election as exogenous event prompts
partisan competition and draws domestic actors’ attention to this issue, resulting in a
potential contention around the issue. Media and party elites are more attentive to the
supranational contest when the two elections are close in time (Oppenhuis et al. 1996,
p. 301; Somer-Topcu and Zar 2014), which should increase the momentum that chal-
lenger parties draw from their European success. Temporal proximity between the
two elections encourages evaluations and political judgements of challenger parties
based on the information pertaining to this European campaign. This should increase
the chance that individuals base their vote decision on the ‘consensus cues’ taken from
the supranational campaign. Importantly, voters gain such cues and may accordingly
rehearse their domestic vote choice irrespective of their actual participation in the
EP elections, which is important in light of the low turnout levels at those secondary
contests.
Consequently, I posit that the momentum effects of success in the EP arena
are greatest when the two elections are close in time. Domestic campaigns that
coincide with the event of EP elections are more permissive to the issue of Euro-
pean integration and authority transfer to the supranational level. I expect that
the potential for spillover of electoral success depends on the domestic attention
levels towards the European performance of a challenger party and on the gen-
eral salience of European integration during a national campaign. Both the former
and the latter are greatest when the temporal distance between both elections is small.
H1: Thehigher the vote share of a challenger party in the EP elections, the greater
the increase in national electoral gains.
H2: The closer in time national and EP election take place, the stronger the effect
of the vote share in the EP election on the increase in national electoral gains.
Design and data
If EP elections foster the success of challenger parties, a strong EP electoral result
should be associated with an increase in the national performance, in particular if the
two elections are close in time. To test this, I create a dataset including the national
election results of Europeanmember states2 since the first EP election on 10 June 1979,
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the respective European election results, the dates of both elections, and the temporal
distance between them (Döring and Manow 2016; European Election Database 2016).
Electoral results and the European cycle
The analysis considers the national performance of all challenger parties in European
member states starting from 1979. Challenger parties are broadly defined as non-
mainstream parties, i.e. Green, radical left and populist radical right party actors (e.g.
Hernández and Kriesi 2016). The classification follows expert surveys (Castles and
Mair 1984; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Benoit and Laver 2006; Bakker et al. 2015). Given
different degrees of party (system) institutionalisation across the European member
states and corresponding different lengths of party survival, the main analysis consid-
ers the respective party family within each national election of a country as the unit
of observation (see for a similar approach Oppenhuis et al. 1996, p. 291). Table 2.1 in-
dicates the robustness of the respective results to using the individual parties within
each election as the unit of analysis. The position of a national election within a Euro-
pean electoral cycle is the difference in days between the national and the European
election divided by the overall length of the European legislation period. EP elec-
tions are held every five years, which means that the denominator is approximately
equal to 1825 days. As discussed above, European issues are most salient in national
campaigns that coincide with an EP campaign. Hence, I expect the effect of EP per-
formance on subsequent national gains to be moderated by the temporal proximity of
the two elections.
Cycle =
NEt   EPt
EPt+1   EPt (2.1)
where NEt is the national election date, EPt the date of the preceding EP election, and EPt+1 the date
of the next EP election.
There are some factors that facilitate challenger parties’ success, which vary
across the 27 European member states in the analysis, particularly the degree of party
system institutionalisation or authoritarian legacies (Kriesi 2016). This kind of hetero-
geneity between countries may systematically relate to challenger parties’ success on
both the European level and the national level and bias the point estimates. Country-
fixed effects hold observed and unobserved variance between countries constant if
this variance is stable over time. We assume that authoritarian legacies and the in-
stitutionalisation of a party system are time-constant after conditioning on decade
dummies. All country-specific covariates that do not vary within decades and might
both influence the vote share of a challenger party in the national and in the European
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context are controlled for by cluster ‘de-meaning’ the data in the fixed-effects model.
The model estimates the national performance of challenger parties as a function of
the interaction between the EP electoral result, the cycle variable, and the respective
constitutive terms. The interaction coefficient can thus be interpreted as the impact
of the EP performance moderated by the position of the cycle variable. The model
equation can be formalised as follows:
yit = 0 + 1xis + 2cit + 3(xis  cit) + kzit + uit (2.2)
for i = 1…27 EU member states; t = 1…n national elections in EU member state i, and s = 1…8 EP elections
preceding the national elections; where y = yit   yi (correspondingly for x; c; z; u); y = vote share of re-
spective party in national election, x = vote share in EP election, c = position of the national election within
a European electoral cycle (see equation 2.1), z = vector of control variables. Unit of analysis is the country-
election level, regression estimation per party family (variance of the residuals varies across party families).
The vector of control variables includes time-variant covariates that may system-
atically relate to the performance of challenger parties at both levels of governance.
The analysis accounts for the permissiveness of the electoral system by including the
logarithm of the average district magnitude in each country’s national elections (John-
son and Wallack 2010) and the logarithm of the average district magnitude in the EP
elections. While the national electoral thresholds have not changed within EU mem-
ber states,3 the model takes the country-specific EP electoral threshold into account,
which in some countries is not time-constant. The literature shows that the extent
of ‘second-orderness’ of a European election varies depending on whether or not the
EP election was a ‘midterm’ election and on the experience that countries have with
EP contests, i.e. the number of EP elections a country has participated in (Hix and
Marsh 2011, p. 6; Marsh 1998, p. 597). The character of the EP elections and the leg-
islative power of the EP itself have changed since the introduction of the EP elections
in 1979. To account for these changes and for other time-specific unobserved hetero-
geneity within the observation period, I introduce four decade dummy variables. Yet,
they do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance in any of the models.
To confront the fact that some of the challengers might themselves get punished in
the EP elections if they were in government before, an indicator variable measures
whether the parties were part of the national executive at the time of the respective
EP election. The variable, however, remains insignificant throughout all models (see
Table 2.1). The results are robust to excluding all challenger populist left, Green and
populist right actors that have been in government (see Table A.6). Finally, the model
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Table 2.1. Fixed-effects regression results of vote share in EP elections on national vote share
conditional on EP electoral cycle
Populist Green Populist
Radical Left Parties Radical Right
Linear Linear Quadratic
EP Vote 0.636*** 0.377*** 0.905***
(0.078) (0.081) (0.133)
Cycle 2.360* 1.840** 0.767
(1.223) (0.809) (4.798)
Cycle2 2.106
(5.070)
EP Vote  Cycle -0.412*** -0.209** -2.302***
(0.130) (0.100) (0.659)
EP Vote  Cycle2 2.295***
(0.739)
Government at EP election 2.432 0.535 2.469
(2.503) (0.831) (1.664)
Midterm EP 0.655 -0.799** 1.278*
(0.597) (0.365) (0.726)
Unemployment 0.407*** 0.009 0.272***
(0.088) (0.051) (0.091)
EP Elections Participated 1.254** 0.456 0.405
(0.487) (0.295) (0.533)
EP Threshold 3.003*** -0.314 -0.600
(0.520) (0.324) (0.557)
National District Magnitude -0.284 0.079 0.775
(0.933) (0.569) (1.066)
European District Magnitude 1.036 0.468 -0.050
(0.791) (0.484) (0.850)
p-value Wald test (LIE) 0.789 0.430 0.001
Decade Fixed-Effects X X X
Robustness of (Non-) Significance of Interaction Term
Cluster Robust SE X x X
Pairs Cluster Bootstrapped SE X x X
Jackknife Parties X x X
Party Fixed-Effects X x X
BIC 901.136 730.484 936.139
N 174 174 174
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Robustness of interaction
effect: pairs cluster bootstrapped SE to account for small cluster size. Jackknife reruns
analysis while omitting one party each regression. Party-fixed effects uses party-specific
dummies instead of country dummies.
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controls for the state of the economy (unemployment rate) that might contribute to a
high number of protest or anti-government votes in EP and national elections (Inter-
national Monetary Fund 2016).
The analysis consists of 174 national elections of EU member states. EP elections
take place every five years, while most European member states hold elections every
four years. Every fourth observation in the data (24.71%) refers to the same EP elec-
tion result as the previous country-specific observation. Yet, while the EP vote share
is equivalent for these cases, the cycle values are necessarily different from each other.
This introduces greater variation among these observations and renders the central
interaction term of interest independent from the previous observations. The cycle
variable is very equally distributed (L-Kurtosis: 0.0116), facilitating the interpretation
of the conditional marginal effects.4 The analysis of the central interaction term pro-
ceeds as follows. As suggested by Hainmueller et al. (2016), I first test whether the
moderating effect of the cycle variable follows the linear interaction effect (LIE) as-
sumption, which is relevant to assess hypothesis H2, positing that the marginal effect
of the EP vote share is conditional on the temporal proximity between both elections.
The functional form of the conditioning effect of the cycle variable does not necessar-
ily need to be linear. To test the LIE assumption, I visualise the conditional marginal
effects within four equally spaced intervals of the cycle variable using the mean condi-
tional marginal effect of the EP vote share in each interval. To obtain these estimates,
the proposed binning estimator by Hainmueller et al. (2016) jointly fits the central in-
teraction to all four individual intervals, while allowing the marginal effects to freely
vary within each interval. A simple Wald test statistic reports whether the linear
interaction model and the binning model are statistically equivalent. Based on the re-
sults of the Wald test, I present the respective country fixed-effects regression results
with the corresponding polynomial specification of the cycle variable. Appendix A
includes semi-parametric kernel smoothed estimates to allow for a fully flexible func-
tional form of the marginal effect of the EP vote share with respect to the position in
the electoral cycle. Those semi-parametric estimates further support the respective
lower and higher-order polynomial specifications reported in the main analysis.5 The
marginal effect plots show a histogram at the bottom of the figure to help readers
assess whether the estimates are supported by data of the moderating cycle variable.
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Figure 2.1. Binning estimates of marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on national vote
share conditional on EP electoral cycle (Green parties)
Results
For Green parties, we find a linear interaction effect. The p-value of 0.43 indicates that
the flexible binning estimates are statistically equivalent to a simple linear interaction
model (see column 2 in Table 2.1). The conditional marginal effect size is substantively
speaking rather small (see Figure 2.1 and 2.2). A one-percentage point increase in the
European arena improves a Green party’s national result only by a maximum of 0.37
percentage points when the national election follows very shortly after an EP elec-
tion. Yet, the interaction term of the European result and the temporal distance to the
EP election is not robust to using bootstrapped or cluster robust standard errors. It
also turns insignificant when using party-fixed effects and when jackknifing parties.
This indicates that the European result does not serve as a domestic ‘marker’ for these
party actors. Scholars have argued that voters are more likely to defect from their na-
tional vote in the supranational elections by switching to Green parties if they prefer
the environmental issue to be instituted at the EP level (Carrubba and Timpone 2005,
p. 273; Gabel 2000). For the same underlying reasons, they might not be inclined to
cast a congruent vote at the next national election even if they just had supported a
Green party at the previous EP election. The result suggests that the (transnational)
policy agenda of Green party actors mitigates a spillover. While Green parties’ policy
platform may lend itself well for a ballot on the European level, supranational success
of these actors contributes only little to their domestic significance. The results show
that the performance of Green parties in the European arena does not encourage band-
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Figure 2.2. Marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on national vote share conditional on
EP electoral cycle (Green parties)
wagon effects in the next domestic electoral contest. On the one hand, this might be
because of their environmental policy-agenda, which voters perceive to be located in
the supranational arena as argued in the previous literature. On the other hand, Green
parties’ European success may also not attract enormous national attention because
of their mostly non-radical policy stances.
For radical right party actors, in contrast, we find considerable empirical sup-
port for a non-linear conditional marginal effect of the EP election result on national
gains. The binning estimates indicate that the cycle does not monotonically moder-
ate this marginal effect, but rather follows the u-shape of a second-order polynomial
(see Figure 2.3 and 2.4). Relying on the Wald test, we reject the null that a naïve lin-
ear interaction model and the binning estimates are statistically equivalent (p-value:
0.001).
As opposed to Green parties, the effect size of the electoral spillover is also sub-
stantively large. During national campaigns that are close in time to an EP election,
a strong second-order result provides the populist radical right with domestic advan-
tages. Whenever the distance to an EP election is less than a year, those party actors
substantially benefit from a one-percentage point increase in their European fortune
by nationally gaining close to the equivalent (around 0.8 percentage points). Yet, if
the temporal distance to an EP election is large and a national election falls in the mid-
dle of a European electoral cycle, a populist radical right party retrieves only small
marginal gains out of its European success (around 0.3 percentage points, comparable
to the size of the spillover for Green parties).6
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Figure 2.3. Binning estimates of marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on national vote
share conditional on EP electoral cycle (populist radical right parties)
The temporal variation in the spillover effect suggests that the salience of Euro-
pean issues in domestic campaigns brings to the fore a ‘highly symbolic issue that fits
[radical right parties’] traditionalist-communitarian ideology’ (Bornschier 2010, p. 63).
When the EP contest comes close in time to a national election, the radical right can
successfully mobilise their opposition against the European project in the domestic
arena. For the populist radical right, the empirical results give support to hypotheses
H1 and H2. The closer the temporal distance between a first-order and a European
second-order election, the higher the chances that a strong EP result of these party
competitors leaves an imprint on their national fortunes.
For the radical left, these hypotheses are, in contrast, only partially corroborated
(see Figure 2.5 and 2.6 and column 1 in Table 2.1). The Wald test of the binning esti-
mate (p-value: 0.789) indicates that the moderating effect of the cycle variable follows
a linear pattern. The decreasing effect size over time shows that a strong EP result
provides radical left actors with a one-time, quickly evaporating increase in national
visibility rather than with a heightened salience of their policy issues even in proxim-
ity to the next second-order election. While the radical left is positionally distinctive
on the traditional left-right political dimension related to redistributional issues, their
positions on the cross-cutting national demarcation vs. European integration dimen-
sion are less clear-cut. Thus, success in EP elections might make some radical left
actors more visible in the short run, but it may not be likely to change the salience of
their core issues in the domestic arena.
The latter finding is only valid for populist radical right party actors and is robust
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Figure 2.4. Marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on national vote share conditional on
EP electoral cycle (populist radical right parties)
to: (a) the exclusion of single parties from the analysis (jackknife procedure);7 and (b)
to the estimation of party-fixed effects instead of country-fixed effects to account
for unobserved organisational differences between parties that might determine both
their EP electoral success and subsequent national gains. The results are also not sensi-
tive to (c) bootstrapping the standard errors to confront a possible overconfidence due
to the small cluster size within the sample.8 The findings are (d) robust to other cor-
relates of populist radical right success frequently discussed in the literature, which
might impact these actors’ success on both governance levels, namely the influx of
asylum seekers, the turnout rate in a given election, or potential party-strategic ad-
vantages for radical right parties determined by the left-right position of the largest
conservative mainstream competitor. Finally, the results remain unchanged if those
elections that follow a first national election within the same EP electoral cycle and
those elections that are held concurrently with an EP election (cycle= 0) are excluded
from the analysis. The various robustness tests are reported in Appendix A. Among
the vector of controls, in contrast, most of the variables do not significantly affect chal-
lenger parties’ electoral fortune across different model specifications. While some of
the measures do have a significant effect in the main model reported in Table 2.1, they
fail to reach statistical significance when pair-clustering standard errors and estimat-
ing the various alternative model specifications, like party-fixed effects (see Table A.6).
The only variable that stands out among the vector of controls is the unemployment
rate that contributes to an increase in populist radical right success on the national
level, confirming previous research on the macro-correlates of populist right success
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Figure 2.5. Binning estimates of marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on national vote
share conditional on EP electoral cycle (populist radical left parties)
across Europe (e.g. Arzheimer 2009). For the populist radical left, in turn, high unem-
ployment does not feed into electoral success robustly across models.
In the following, I investigate the underlying mechanism driving the spillover
effect for the populist right by: (a) showing that the spillover does not stem from sim-
ilar levels of support for the populist right across the European and the national arena;
and by (b) showing that the salience of European integration in domestic campaigns
drives the spillover.
Congruence of voters’ party preferences across arenas?
To identify a spillover effect of EP electoral success, I propose a placebo-test assess-
ing whether both national and EP results are affected by the same unobserved factors
rather than by European success feeding into national success. To the extent that
election results measure voters’ party preferences and a party’s current popularity,
the closer to (or further apart from) each other two elections take place, the greater
(lower) the association between the results to be expected. The voluminous empir-
ical evidence from the second-order literature suggests that different voting calculi
apply to both kinds of elections, which is supported by parties’ different results at
concurrent national and European elections. Yet, if we still assume that voters’ party
preferences are partially congruent across the national and supranational arena, an
alternative explanation for the cyclical spillover effect is given by potential similar
popularity levels of populist radical right parties in the EP and national elections.9 If
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Figure 2.6. Marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on national vote share conditional on
EP electoral cycle (populist radical left parties)
this were the case, however, we should find the same cyclical pattern when predict-
ing the success of radical right parties in the European election (dependent variable)
conditional on the interaction between temporal distance to the last national election
and the respective electoral result.
However, the placebo-test does not give any support to a similar cyclical spillover
effect. The binning estimate first suggests a linear functional form of a national
spillover to the European area (p-value of the LIE assumption: 0.428). Second, the
interaction term between the position of the European election in the national elec-
tion and the national vote share is insignificant (and marginally positive). The full
results of this placebo-test are reported in the Table A.4 and Figures A.4 and A.5.
Supposing that the spillover from the second-order arena to the domestic one
were only driven by a high congruence of voters’ preferences across governance lev-
els, we should, however find the same decreasing strength of association the greater
the temporal distance between both elections. Yet, the placebo-test shows a differ-
ent pattern. This indicates that the institution of the EP elections and the salience
of European integration in itself fosters the spillover of populist radical right success
rather than a high correlation between voters’ preferences spanning the different gov-
ernance levels.
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EP elections as quasi-exogenous event
It is worth to exploit the quasi-exogenous nature of the EP contest as a political event.
To date, any given member state has consistently participated in the EP elections,
rendering the existence of this political institution and its timing largely exogenous
to party actors’ strategic short-term influence. Hence, a conservative test to assess
whether the institution of the EP elections in itself prompts the salience of populist
radical right parties’ issues and fosters their visibility in the national arena, is given
when we reassess the mere impact of the EP elections as an event, not considering a
party’s actual performance therein.
When re-estimating the model and only including the continuous cycle variable
as predictor of a challenger party’s national success instead of the interaction term, the
quadratic cycle variable maintains its statistical significance for the radical right (see
Table 2.2).10 The coefficient indicates the same u-curved relationship between tempo-
ral proximity of the two elections and marginal gains in the national vote shares of
populist radical right parties. Exploiting the quasi-exogeneity of the temporal prox-
imity to the EP contest, we find that the event of the EP election in itself augments
the electoral prospects for populist radical right parties. This is not the case for pop-
ulist radical left and Green parties whose national performance is not significantly
affected by a temporal proximity to the European contest. Previous research shows
that individuals feel particularly negative about the EU in the year of an EP election
(Beaudonnet and Franklin 2016). Hence, when the European campaigns coincide with
the national electoral campaigns, the salience of Europe in domestic politics accentu-
ates radical right actors’ electoral gains. It appears that such domestic contests are
particularly favourable to increase the radical right’s mobilisation on anti-EU stances
and ‘pulling voters’ whomight not have supported them on the basis of their left-right
concerns (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004, p. 47). The European contest seems to offer
party actors who represent both the anti-European and authoritarian-nationalistic at-
titudes of many voters a permeable forum to politicise these issues domestically. The
pace of further deepening and widening of the EU has not always been accompanied
by an increase of citizens’ level of support for further integration. On the contrary,
citizens’ Eurosceptic attitudes have increased over the years (Eichenberg and Dalton
2007). Whenever the European and the national campaigns coincide, issues relating
to further European integration make their way into the domestic arena. This affects
party competition and creates opportunities for such challengers who favour demar-
cation as opposed to further integration, namely actors from the populist right-wing
end of the spectrum (Kriesi 2007).
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Table 2.2. Fixed-effects regression results of EP electoral cycle on national vote share
Populist Green Populist
Radical Left Parties Radical Right
Linear Linear Quadratic
Cycle 0.831 -0.021 -11.591**
(1.052) (0.720) (5.477)
Cycle2 15.095**
(5.811)
Controls X X X
Decade Fixed-Effects X X X
Robustness of (Non-) Significance of Interaction Term
Cluster Robust SE X X X
Pairs Cluster Bootstrapped SE X X X
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Robustness of interaction
effect: pairs cluster bootstrapped SE to account for small cluster size.
Conclusions
Recently, scholars contended that the European direct elections are not working as
elections ‘are supposed to perform’. They are second-rate in failing to achieve their
supposed objectives – to provide direct policy consequences (Franklin 2017). This dif-
ferent character of the European contest leaves the Union merely with the intended
consequence of decreasing its ‘democratic deficit’. Following the seminal work of Reif
and Schmitt (1980), there is a voluminous literature on the character of the suprana-
tional contest, the voting calculus, and the policy issues involved therein. Yet, ‘in
reality, we find influences running in both directions’ (van der Eijk, Franklin, and
Marsh 1996), and the secondary elections themselves impact domestic party systems.
This analysis highlights that a ‘vote against Europe’, particularly once made visible
in European elections, may decisively shape domestic elections. The supranational
contest offers populist radical right actors an opportunity structure to mobilise vot-
ers based on their antagonism towards the elite-consensus on European integration.
By shifting the focus to the national arena, this chapter first shows that the direct
second-order elections have important national consequences. While anecdotal evi-
dence holds that the EP elections provided parties like AfD, Front Nationale or the
Sweden Democrats with the first favourable opportunity for gaining momentum and
translating their success into national power, the present analysis offers a systematic
analysis of such spillover effects across all European member states and national elec-
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tions since 1979. Second, the study disentangles the mechanisms behind these elec-
toral spillover effects, corroborating the idea that populist radical right parties draw
crucial momentum from EP success. If national and European elections are close in
time, the salience of European integration boosts the domestic electoral prospects of
radical right parties.
Future research is necessary to explore the potential variation in the European
spillover effects across different party systems. Mainstream parties’ responses to Eu-
ropean success of a populist right challenger, the policy-influence of those actors
within a country, and country-specific variation in the evolution of saliency of Eu-
ropean integration might crucially mediate the cyclical spillover effect. This might
put in motion or prevent further spillover effects from the national to the European
arena. Future research should also address the underlying micro-level mechanisms.
Individual-level panel data across European countries could help to assess whether in-
dividuals who turn out for a challenger party in the EP elections are alsomore likely to
cast a similar ‘habitual’ ballot in the following national contest. If this were the case,
the EP elections would contribute to individual partisan re- or dealignment, work-
ing as a ‘virtual pump’ that may pull impressionable voters from mainstream parties
(Franklin 2017). Dinas and Riera (2018) show that individuals who first became eligi-
ble for a European election are more likely to support a small party than individuals
who became eligible for a national election, arguing that the act of voting socialises
individuals into such voting patterns (Dinas and Riera 2018). In light of the compar-
atively low turnout levels in EP elections, such habitual voting may only partially
account for the electoral spillover of populist radical right success. The experimental
evidence from the bandwagon literature and the empirical results in this chapter sup-
port the idea that also individuals who did not participate in the European contest are
encouraged to cast a ballot for a populist radical right party after its success in the
supranational arena, based on the consensus cues they take from mass support levels
in the supranational arena. This hypothesis should be empirically addressed by future
research.
The salience of European integration seems decisive in explaining the populist
right spillover effects to the domestic arena. This salience is augmented when the
national election occurs in close temporal proximity to the EP contest. Neither Green
nor populist radical left actors are able to similarly capitalise on European success.
While populist radical right parties do play a part in politicising Europe, they are
also among the most hostile actors towards further European integration. In view of
their opposition to an integrative Europe, it seems rather ironic that the supranational
contest fosters the ascendency of just these opponents of the European idea.
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Notes
1. The different turnout levels in European and national elections, however, seem to
relate mostly to the timing of the EP elections on the structural level and to patterns
of habitual voting on the individual level (Schmitt and Mannheimer 1991; Franklin,
van der Eijk, et al. 1996). Thus, the difference in participation levels in the EP and
the national contest does not evoke systematic benefits for challenger parties in EP
elections.
2. The sample includes 27 country-clusters since Croatia does not have sufficient ob-
servations to perform the within-estimation, i.e. two national elections each following
an EP election.
3. One exception is a single election in France (1986); the results are not sensitive
to the inclusion of the national electoral threshold as a covariate.
4. The low value of the L-Kurtosis indicates that the distribution and the shape of
the cycle variable is not characterised by strong outliers, safeguarding against extrap-
olation of the marginal effects based on little supporting data (Hosking 1990).
5. The semi-parametric estimates result from a series of locally linear regressions
using kernel re-weighting based on the distance between each value of the cycle and
each evaluation point.
6. This small improvement differs statistically significantly (on the 95% level) from
an electoral spillover in a national election being held up until half a year after a
European election and (on the 90% level) from an electoral spillover in a national
election being held half a year ahead of a European election.
7. The results are also robust towards the inclusion of contested cases, like the Dutch
List Pim Fortyn, the United Kingdom Independence Party, and the True Finns.
8. The p-values are estimated using pairs cluster bootstrapped t-statistics for fixed
effects panel linear models, see Esarey and Menger (2016) for a detailed discussion.
9. Based on the previous findings for the radical left and the Greens, this alternative
explanation would imply that: (a) voters’ party preferences generally have a higher
congruence for the radical right across governance levels than for the two other actors;
and that (b) that those preferences are less stable across time. I remain agnostic about
the likelihood of those assumptions and strengthen the argument for a ‘momentum
effect’ by rejecting the potential alternative explanation.
10. The respective linear or quadratic cycle specifications, which did not find em-
pirical support based on the binning estimates are omitted from the table. When
considered, they all yield insignificant results.
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CHAPTER 3
The Effect of European Parliament Elections on Political
Socialisation
While the founders of the European Parliament (EP) elections aspired to actively en-
gage citizens in building Europe (Committee on Political Affairs 1960), even 40 years
after their introduction, the elections invigorate little interest among the public and
turnout rates tend to be low. Recently, scholars have argued that the second-order EP
elections do not only fall short of achieving their original objectives, but, to make mat-
ters worse, do even have adverse effects on individuals’ future political engagement.
These concerns regard particularly young and impressionable voters who have not
yet been socialised into voting habits. In contrast to most of the US literature that as-
sumes a genuinely positive and habit-forming effect from past-voting experience on
future political participation, even induced in low-salience elections, these scholars
caution against the unanticipated impact of the European elections. They fear that the
EP contest contributes to a decline in attitudes that are conducive to voting, possibly
depressing their interest to participate even in other elections (Franklin and Hobolt
2011). In addition, scholars suspect that the elections might increase first-time vot-
ers’ attachments to challenger parties. The characteristic voting logic of EP elections
favours non-strategic voting for challenger parties and the campaign offers political
actors an opportunity to mobilise against further integration, which tends to benefit
populist right challengers (Schulte-Cloos 2018). Guided by this second-order election
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logic, first-time voters may develop lasting partisan bonds to such challenger parties
(Dinas and Riera 2018; Franklin 2017), which could contribute to fuel anti-European
sentiments.
This study examines the effect of EP elections on political socialisation. Relying
on a quasi-experimental approach, namely a regression discontinuity design (RDD),
I identify the effect that first-time eligibility for the EP elections has for political atti-
tudes and behaviour. To do so, I exploit the exogenous variation in first-time eligibil-
ity among respondents of a cross-national youth study (EUYOUPART) fielded in 2004.
The design compares two groups of adolescents that are indistinguishable from each
other but differ with respect to whether they came of age for the EP elections. The
fact that some of the adolescents happened to turn eligible just before election day
and some others happened to reach voting age slightly later creates a natural discon-
tinuity among the young respondents: half had the chance to participate on election
day and cast their first ever vote in the European Parliament elections, while the other
half did not. This identification strategy effectively isolates the electoral socialisation
effect since the comparison group consists of individuals who were ineligible at the
time of the EP election. Relying on the discontinuity generated through respondents’
eligibility, the study is able to causally identify the effect of EP elections for (a) young
individuals’ interest in politics, and (b) their partisan attachment to challenger parties.
The results show that voting in the EP elections has a positive effect on attitudes
that are conducive to voting. Instead of becoming politically disaffected after having
participated in the supranational contest, young individuals receive positive feedback
from voting and express a stronger interest in politics in general and European poli-
tics in particular. This indicates that even in the second-order EP elections, voting has
a positive impact on political engagement among first-time voters, a finding consis-
tent with classical accounts on ‘participatory democracy’ and research into habitual
voting in the US. The positive effect of the European contest on first-time voters’ po-
litical interest is substantive in magnitude and can still be detected more than five
years afterwards. The results show no evidence, in contrast, that first-time eligibility
and participation in the European elections strengthen young voters’ partisan bonds
to anti-European challenger parties. These findings bear crucial relevance since indi-
viduals are most receptive towards political socialisation stimuli during early adult-
hood. Individuals’ level of political interest has been found to be remarkably stable
once formed during early adulthood (Prior 2010). In view of the previously suspected
inertial or disintegrative effect of the EP elections on young voters’ future political
behaviour, the results of this study appear encouraging for those who expect that
participation in EP elections may promote positive engagement with the EU.
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The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I integrate the arguments
from the second-order elections theory with the literature on political socialisation
and action-induced attitude formation, deriving a set of theoretical expectations to be
tested. I then move to discuss the difficulties in isolating the causal effect of participa-
tion in EP elections among young voters and introduce the quasi-experimental design
of this study that overcomes those problems. Subsequently, I present the empirical
findings demonstrating that the supranational contest has integrative potential in fos-
tering the political interest of first-time voters. This effect is long-lasting and persists
for more than five years. Placebo tests and various robustness tests corroborate the
results. The final section concludes.
First-time eligibility and electoral participation in
second-order EP elections
The electoral context of the EP elections is structurally different from national elec-
tions as (1) there is no resulting government formation, and (2) the campaign and
mobilisation efforts are minimal. Both of these factors work to decrease the incen-
tives for individuals to participate. Strong incentives to participate in a given election
are particularly important to mobilise first-time voters as they lack previous voting ex-
perience or voting habits. As the first electoral participation is important in setting in
motion a life-long political engagement (Abramson et al. 1998; Plutzer 2002; Franklin
2004), the structurally different electoral context of the EP elections may inculcate a
lasting political disaffection among young voters.
In his seminal piece on political apathy, Rosenberg (1954) argues that in the ab-
sence of ‘spurs to action’ individuals are more likely to become politically disengaged
and uninterested. The political consequences resulting from the EP elections are less
obvious to voters than in domestic elections as the EP elections do not result in gov-
ernment formation nor in immediate consequences for policy (Franklin 2017, p. 246;
Reif and Schmitt 1980). In addition, European campaign and mobilisation efforts by
parties tend to be lower than in the national contests (Weber 2007, p. 480; de Vreese,
Banducci, et al. 2006), decreasing the competitiveness of the elections and respective
stimuli to participate (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, p. 249).
The presence or absence of the stimuli generated by a given electoral context
affect the newly enfranchised group of young voters most strongly (Franklin 2004,
p. 80; Kogan et al. 2018). As adolescents lack an ‘experiential base’ of repeated
political behaviours, their political attitudes and orientations are particularly suscep-
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tible to influence (Jennings 1990, p. 315). Young individuals who experience their
first voting during EP elections, which were characterised by low competitiveness,
a low-salience campaign and few mobilisation efforts, may not receive ‘positive
feedback’ (Plutzer 2002, p. 43) from electoral participation. Given that their first
electoral experience pertains to a modestly competitive election marked by lacklustre
party mobilisation efforts, it may be less likely that they engage with the electoral
contest or develop a sense of being a political citizen in forming attitudes that are
conducive to voting even in future elections. Thus, first-time eligibility and voting
in the European elections may leave newly enfranchised adolescents disillusioned
with the workings of politics. Given that the first electoral experience is crucial in
instilling a ritual, life-long political engagement, the nature of the EP elections might
politically disengage adolescents and depress their interest in politics in the long-term.
H1 Adverse effects: First-time eligibility and first-time voting in the Eu-
ropean Parliament elections depresses individuals’ interest in politics.
Theories of ‘participatory democracy’ (Pateman 1970; Finkel 1985;Thompson 1970), in
contrast, suggest that the EP elections may have a positive effect on individuals’ politi-
cal interest even if the European contest holds a low-salience character. When coming
of age and receiving the opportunity to cast a vote for the first time, young individ-
uals are encouraged to vote due to their eligibility for the election. Having reached
voting age, they are more likely to engage with parties’ statements, their election
campaigns, or exchange political views with adults (Bhatti, Hansen, and Wass 2016,
p. 153). Given that the socio-psychological reward of voting is particularly high dur-
ing first time enfranchisement, adolescents try to follow the campaign more closely
and acquire relevant information in anticipation of the imminent first chance to ever
cast a vote (Grill and Boomgaarden 2018; Konzelmann et al. 2012; Bhatti and Hansen
2012; Shineman 2018). Thus, being incentivised to vote for the first time in their lives
should raise young voters’ interest in and receptiveness to the relevant European po-
litical issues at stake.
Feeling encouraged to participate due to first-time eligibility, some of the ado-
lescents decide to take on their newly acquired civic right even if the elections do not
result in the formation of a European government. Once they have participated in the
EP elections, these young voters may become even more curious about politics in an
attempt to align their attitudes with their decision to cast a vote. Socio-psychological
research shows that individuals adjust their attitudes after choosing between two
alternatives, i.e. to vote or to abstain (Festinger 1957; Brehm 1956). After having
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chosen one of the two alternatives, individuals increase their preference for the
selected option. This socio-psychological mechanism may account for the fact
that many citizens either vote or abstain in a rather consistent manner throughout
their lives and mobilisation efforts (‘Get Out the Vote’ campaigns) have long-term
effects in generating voting habits. Coppock and Green (2016, p. 1046) show that
such habit effects are particularly strong in low-salience elections where there is
the greatest need to reduce a potential dissonance between previous behaviour
(turnout despite the low salience of the election) and attitudes. Thus, those young
individuals who participated in the EP elections are likely to justify their turnout
by changing relevant cognitions towards politics. In an attempt to support their
choice to vote in the supranational contest despite of its second-order character, they
might rationalise their participatory effort by developing a ‘taste’ for politics. As
to avoid any potential cognitive discomfort arising out of their decision, they may
develop a particular interest in politics in general and European politics in particular.
H2 Participatory effects: First-time eligibility and voting in the Euro-
pean Parliament elections increases individuals’ interest in politics.
Related to these socio-psychological arguments of action-induced attitude formation,
vote choice may also impact individuals’ ties to parties as the act of voting itself
reinforces pre-existing partisan preferences. Taking on a classical argument by
Converse (1969), studies convincingly show that voting for a certain candidate
brings about a cognitive change towards better valuing the differences between
available candidates (Mullainathan and Washington 2009) and towards feeling closer
to the chosen candidate (Meredith 2009; Dinas 2014; Beasley and Joslyn 2001). Thus,
after committing to a certain candidate over an alternative one on election day,
individuals engage in cognitively supporting this commitment by increasing their
preference for the chosen option. Dinas and Riera (2018) argue that the same may
hold for vote choice in multi-party systems as in the EP elections. In light of the
structurally different nature of the EP elections discussed before and as shown in
numerous studies documenting their ‘second-order character’ (e.g. van der Eijk and
Franklin 2009; Schmitt 2005), challenger parties have better prospects of success
in the supranational contest than in other elections. Given that the EP contest
holds a low saliency and does not lead to government formation, individuals who
participate are inclined to support a challenger party that corresponds closely to their
policy-preferences (Hix and Marsh 2007) or mobilises their latent Euroscepticism
(van Egmond 2007). In particular, young voters who have not yet developed stable
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partisan ties because they lack previous electoral experience, should be most inclined
to be guided by these second-order incentive structures of the EP elections and,
accordingly, support a challenger party in the EP elections. In line with action-based
models of preference formation, the act of voting for a party should subsequently
intensify adolescents’ bonds to the party in question. Given the second-order
character of the European elections, on average, such a process of habitual prefer-
ence formation should work to strengthen their partisan ties to challenger parties.
H3 Challenger ties: First-time electoral participation in the European Par-
liament elections increases individuals’ proximity to challenger parties.
In summary, regarding the effect of the EP elections on adolescents’ interest in poli-
tics, I propose two competing hypotheses, namely the ‘adverse effect hypothesis’ (H1)
and the ‘participatory effects hypothesis’ (H2). Concerning an impact on young indi-
viduals’ partisan preferences, I formulate the ‘challenger ties hypothesis’ (H3).
Identifying the causal effect of EP elections for polit-
ical socialisation
Previous empirical studies that argue EP elections may have adverse effects in de-
pressing future turnout among young voters (Franklin and Hobolt 2011, p. 75), or in
strengthening their partisan ties to challenger parties (Dinas and Riera 2018; Franklin
2017) have greatly advanced our theoretical understanding of the potential impact
of EP elections on the electoral behaviour of young voters. However, there are two
limitations of existing empirical designs, which I briefly discuss before moving on to
present the identification strategy proposed in this chapter.
First, existing work relies on a noisy measure of the treatment variable, i.e. in-
dividuals’ first eligibility for EP elections by relying on their year of birth. As those
studies need to exclude all individuals who came of age in the respective year of the EP
elections, the age difference between young voters in treatment and control group in-
creases substantially. This magnifies chances that the exclusion restriction is violated
and adolescents’ age difference relates to the outcome variables through a mechanism
other than being eligible for the EP elections (e.g. Angrist and Keueger 1991, p. 1004).
Second, this data is censored and includes only respondents that were at least 18 years
old and eligible to vote in the EP elections. Thus, the designs include only treated in-
dividuals and no control units that have not been eligible in the EP elections. The
53
control group in these studies consists of young adolescents that already came of age
in an earlier national election and have also experienced the treatment of the EP elec-
tions. Considering the persistence of voting habits as discussed before, this ‘control’
group has furthermore received another treatment (being eligible to vote in a national
contest). This conflates the effects of (a) first-time eligibility for the European ‘little
at stake’ elections, and (b) political socialisation due to earlier eligibility.1
To estimate the causal effect of the EP elections on political interest and first-time
voters’ closeness to challenger parties, an ideal experiment would randomly assign
whether or not young voters are eligible and/or cast a vote in the EP elections. While
I cannot resort to this ideal experiment, the exogenous date of the EP elections and the
exogenous variation in young voters’ eligibility offers a quasi-experimental approach
that comes close to this ideal experiment. To identify the causal effect of first-time
eligibility in EP elections on political socialisation among young voters, I first compare
those individuals who are newly enfranchised to those individuals who come of age a
few months after the EP elections and are not experiencing the secondary European
elections as enfranchised voter. If the EP elections have any effects in politically (dis-)
engaging young individuals, the first-time enfranchisement for the second-order EP
elections should, on average, impact young individuals’ political interest.2 This effect
is independent of whether adolescents vote in the second-order contest, which is key
as it has been argued that the low saliency of the elections, i.e. the nature of the EP
elections itself, might contribute to depress political engagement among young voters
(Franklin andHobolt 2011). I further identify the effect of actual electoral participation
in the EP elections on political interest and young individuals’ partisan attachments
to challenger parties. To do so, I consider participation in the EP elections among
eligible individuals as a one-sided non-compliance with the treatment and estimate
the so-called ‘complier average treatment effect’ (CACE) using instrumental variable
regression.3 By using the precise age of young voters as an instrument for voting
in the EP elections, I construct the unobserved potential turnout among the control
group, i.e. ineligible individuals.4
Data and validity of the identification strategy
The study relies on a cross-national dataset (‘EUYOUPART’) containing information
regarding party preferences, political interest and participation of adolescents sur-
veyed in 2004 (Ogris et al. 2008). While being quite dated, this dataset has several
important advantages that make it well suited for studying the socialising effect of
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the EP elections within the framework of a causal design. First, it overcomes the
problem of data truncation at the age of 18 as it includes individuals between 15 and
25 years; thus, it includes ineligible individuals who did not yet receive other socialisa-
tion stimuli from earlier enfranchisement. Second, the dataset entails the birth month
of respondents, allowing us to exploit the variation in first-time EP eligibility among
otherwise similar respondents so as to study the causal effects of the EP elections
for political socialisation among impressionable first-time voters. Third, the dataset
includes countries from the major three politically different regions within Europe,
i.e. Southern Europe, Northwestern Europe and Central-Eastern Europe (Kriesi 2016).
These countries are Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and the United King-
dom.5 Finally, individuals were interviewed six months after the European elections
(in December 2004). The results presented here can therefore be understood as lasting
socialisation effects that are different from potential priming effects stemming from
a recent exposure to the European election campaigns. The major shortcoming of the
dataset is that it dates from 2004. While the institutional design of the EP elections has
slightly changed since then, most notably with the introduction of the Spitzenkandi-
daten (lead candidates) in the EP elections campaign 2014, scholars have documented
that this new institutional feature has largely remained unnoticed by voters (Schmitt,
Hobolt, et al. 2015, p. 357). Another concern relates to changes in the party landscape,
most notably with the establishment of relevant challenger actors in two of the coun-
tries included in the study, namely the Five StarMovement in Italy and the Alternative
for Germany in Germany. While other currently relevant populist right challenger
parties within the countries included in this study, like the French National Front, the
Italian Lega, the Finnish True Finns, and the United Kingdom Independence Party
and other currently relevant radical left actors, like the French Communist Party, the
German Left Party, the Finnish Democratic Left Alliance, or the Italian Communist
Refoundation Party and the various Green party actors already contested the EP elec-
tions in 2004, we should keep the potential constraints to external validity in mind
when interpreting the socialising effects of the EP elections on the attachments to the
challenger parties that are included in the EUYOUPART dataset. For a full list of those
challenger parties see Table B.2 in Appendix B.
When regarding the discontinuity in eligibility for the EP elections a clean and
quasi-random design, we make two assumptions. First, we assume that individuals
are not able to manipulate their treatment status.6 Considering that individuals do
not have control over the precise month in which they turn 18, this first assumption
seems reasonable. Second, we assume that their treatment status does not selectively
affect the likelihood of responding to the survey, i.e. the study should not be affected
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by differential attrition. The monthly distribution of young respondents who either
receive the treatment or control condition does not vary from themonthly distribution
of respondents in the respective non-EP years of the study (see Figure B.1 in Appendix
B). This makes it reasonable to expect that the treatment status does not selectively
affect individuals’ likelihood of responding to the survey.
Adolescents in the treatment and control group are highly similar to each other
with respect to key socio-demographic variables and such variables that the literature
has identified to predict turnout among young voters, like parental status transmis-
sion or political reproduction (Bhatti and Hansen 2012; Gidengil et al. 2016). The
balance statistics show that the mean differences on respondents’ gender, education
level, standard of living, rural origin, religiousness, civic engagement in school, par-
ents’ political interest and parents’ higher education are not statistically different from
a distribution resulting from random permutation of the treatment variable within
country strata (see Table B.4 in Appendix B). Individuals in the treatment group are,
however, slightly less likely to live with their parents than individuals in the control
group. This should make it less likely to detect a potential treatment effect on the
political interest of young voters as previous research has argued that young adults
tend to be exposed to political discussions more frequently when living at home with
their parents (Bhatti and Hansen 2012, p. 386; Fieldhouse and Cutts 2012).7 Further,
the parents of treated adolescents vote somewhat less frequently than parents in the
control group. As the treatment assignment is independent of potential outcomes, I
present both simple differences in means without adjusting for covariates (allowing
for country-specific baselines), and fully specified models controlling for the variables
presented in Table B.4.
The relevant outcome variables are individuals’ political and European political
interest, measured on a one to four scale (ranging from ‘not at all interested’ to ‘very
interested’), and individuals’ closeness to the respective parties in question, measured
on a one to five scale (ranging from ‘very distant’ to ‘very close’).
Results
I first present the estimates of an impact of the EP elections on young individuals’
interest in politics.8 While the effect of eligibility (column 1 and 2 of Table 3.1) con-
siders all individuals who had the chance to cast their first vote in the second-order
contest and compares them to their highly similar but slightly younger and ineligible
individuals, models 3 and 4 focus only on the effect of actual voting.
56 CHAPTER 3. EP ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL SOCIALISATION
Table 3.1. Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting on interest in politics
Dependent variable: political interest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eligible 0.11 (0.02) 0.12 (0.02)
Voting 0.24 (0.09) 0.24 (0.06)
Random. Inf. (p-value) 0.04 0.01
Age [17.25-18.75] [17.25-18.75] [17.25-18.75] [17.25-18.75]
Method OLS OLS IV IV
Controls x X x X
Observations 747 747 698 698
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01. Constant and country-fixed effects omitted from output.
Bell-McCaffrey bias adjusted robust SE in parentheses. Inverse probability weights ac-
counting for different probabilities of assignment to treatment and control conditions be-
tween country blocks. Entries of eligibility present ITT estimates, entries of voting CACE
estimates.
There is no support for the adverse effect hypothesis (H1), positing that young
voters might become politically disengaged due to the low-salience and second-rate
character of the supranational contest. Instead, we find support for the ‘participatory
effects’ hypothesis assuming that the EP elections and the encouragement to vote in
the supranational contest makes young individuals more interested in political mat-
ters. Both the ITT estimate in models 1 and 2 (the overall effect of experiencing the EP
elections and related campaigns while having reached voting age) and the CACE esti-
mate in models 3 and 4 (actual electoral participation) show a positive and from zero
statistically distinguishable effect of the EP elections. Eligibility for the EP elections
instils a greater political interest among young individuals and this effect is further
augmented when they participate in the supranational contest. Compared to their
slightly younger counterparts who would have cast a ballot in the elections had they
been eligible, first-time voters report a 0.24 point higher interest in politics. This cor-
responds to an increase of a third of a standard deviation on the one to four scale.
Importantly, I find the same substantial effects when focusing on first-time voters’
interest in European politics (see Table B.5 in Appendix B).9 These results are in line
with recent field-experimental evidence by Shineman (2018), showing that individu-
als who were mobilised and incentivised to vote in highly complex and low-salience
local elections in the U.S. acquired more political information. The encouragement to
vote in the EP elections that individuals receive from being eligible for the first time
in their lives seems to arouse their sense of being a political citizen. Coming of age
for the supranational contest prompts a greater level of political interest.
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Table 3.2. Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting on partisan ties to challenger parties
Dependent variable: closeness to challenger parties
Rad. Left Green Rad. Right Anti-EU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eligible (OLS)  0.01 (0.07) 0.14 (0.05)  0.05 (0.14)  0.12 (0.13)
Voting (IV)  0.02 (0.19) 0.24 (0.14)  0.09 (0.37)  0.21 (0.35)
Random. Inf. (p-value) 0.89 0.16 0.62 0.20
Age [17.25-18.75] [17.25-18.75] [17.25-18.75] [17.25-18.75]
Controls X X X X
Observations 524 533 533 546
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01. Constant and country-fixed effects omitted from output.
Bell-McCaffrey bias adjusted robust SE in parentheses. P-values of two-tailed tests based
on randomisation inference (permutation within countries). Inverse probability weights
accounting for different probabilities of assignment to treatment and control conditions
between country blocks. Entries of eligibility present ITT estimates, entries of voting
CACE estimates.
Next, I assess whether first-time voting in the EP elections strengthens individ-
uals’ ties to challenger parties. I use the exogenous eligibility of young respondents
as an instrument for voting in the EP elections to obtain the causal effect of partic-
ipation in the EP elections on the partisan ties to challenger parties. Respondents
were asked how close they feel to the main political parties within their countries on
a one to five scale. I consider adolescents’ proximity to challenger parties, classified
according to four different party families following expert surveys (for details and al-
ternative classifications see Appendix B): populist radical left, Green, populist right,
and Eurosceptic parties.
The results show that voting in the EP elections does not intensify young vot-
ers’ attachment to challenger parties (see Table 3.2). I do not find any evidence that
first-time participation increases voters’ ties to either Eurosceptic, radical left or right
challenger parties. As radical left and radical right parties tend to oppose European
integration most strongly (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002), this finding suggests
that the EP elections do not accentuate first-time voters’ policy preferences against
further European integration in strengthening their partisan ties to such parties that
are mobilising against the supranational project. The coefficient of voting in the Eu-
ropean elections on the closeness to populist radical right and anti-European actors
is even negative though it does not reach statistical significance. The coefficient for
Green parties, in contrast, is positive, and compared to the other coefficients largest
in size. However, the coefficient could also result by chance as indicated by the in-
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significant p-value when relying on randomisation inference. Thus, the evidence that
the EP elections socialise first-time voters into support for Green parties remains only
suggestive. Importantly, the second-order elections do not arouse Eurosceptic or na-
tionalistic policy preferences in fostering ties to radical left, populist radical right or
anti-European party actors.
Placebo-tests and robustness of the results
While the balance statistics show that individuals are very similar to each other across
treatment and control groups, by construction, the age of individuals is not balanced.
Should the difference in the political interest between adolescents in the treatment
and control group only result from the slight difference in age, we would find the
same positive and statistically significant coefficient when analysing the effect of fic-
tive EP elections while keeping the difference in age between the respective ‘pseudo-
treatment’ and ‘pseudo-control’ groups constant. I analyse the effect of eligibility for
fictive EP elections in the four years prior to the actual EP elections in 2004 and in
the year after, which is a pseudo-treatment in the future at the time of the interview.
The results show no significant effect for any of the possible placebo years neither
regarding the eligibility (ITT) nor the effect of participation in the elections (CACE),
as instrumented through an indicator of having reached the legal voting age for the
respective placebo elections. All coefficients are indistinguishably close to zero (see
Table 3.3). The placebo EP elections yield also no statistically significant results for
adolescents’ interest in European politics (see Table B.6 in Appendix B). To the extent
that the effect between individuals assigned to either eligibility or ineligibility for the
European elections could be explained by the fact that eligible young voters are on
average nine months older than their ineligible counterparts, we should, however, de-
tect the same difference when analysing the effect of fictive treatment conditions in
the placebo EP elections.
I also rerun the analysis using a much smaller bandwidth, thereby substantially
limiting the number of observations in the sample. By decreasing the window around
the eligibility cut-off, individuals within the treatment and control group are even less
distinguishable regarding their precise age in months.10 The main results regarding
young individuals’ interest in politics remain unchanged when minimising the differ-
ence between treated and control individuals to a tiny window of only four months
around the cut-off (see column 1 and 2 in Table 3.4). Table B.7 in Appendix B further
shows that the findings are highly robust across other bandwidths around the cut-off.
59
Table 3.3. Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting in placebo EP elections on interest in
politics
Dependent variable: political interest
2000 2001 2002 2003 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Eligible (OLS) 0.03 (0.06)  0.01 (0.02) 0.04 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 0.05 (0.04)
Voting (IV) 0.05 (0.18)  0.01 (0.06) 0.08 (0.06) 0.06 (0.10) 0.11 (0.07)
Controls X X X X X
Observations 798 815 871 893 1,026
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01. Constant and country-fixed effects omitted from output.
Bell-McCaffrey bias adjusted robust SE in parentheses. Inverse probability weights ac-
counting for different probabilities of assignment to treatment and control conditions be-
tween country blocks. Entries of eligibility present ITT estimates, entries of voting CACE
estimates.
Long-run effects
The results shown in the previous section present a sizeable increase in first-time vot-
ers’ political interest after participation in the European supranational contest. The
measurement of individuals’ political interest takes place six months after the EP elec-
tion, meaning that the difference in the level of political interest between treatment
and control group cannot be attributed to mere priming effects of the European cam-
paign. Instead, eligibility and voting in the EP elections has a lasting effect going
beyond the exposure to the supranational electoral campaign. However, once those
who used to be ineligible for the EP contest reach voting age for national elections just
like their slightly older counterparts who had already come of age for the European
elections, the difference in the level of political interest may fade away. To understand
whether this is the case or whether, to the contrary, being a first-time voter in the EP
elections creates long-run effects, I analyse the difference in the level of political in-
terest among previous first-time voters more than five years after the EP election. To
do so, I focus on the difference in political interest among those young voters in the
dataset who came of age for the EP elections 1999 and those who reached legal voting
age slightly later. The results show that the positive impact of being eligible and cast-
ing a vote persists for more than five years. Importantly, by the time of the interview
five years after the EP elections, these individuals had experienced the same number
of national elections that may also have a socialising impact in arousing their political
interest. The control group of individuals in this comparison, however, came of age
for a national election, suggesting that the size of the positive socialising impact of
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Table 3.4. Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting on interest in politics (tiny bandwidth
and long-term effects)
Dependent variable: political interest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eligible 0.22 (0.03) 0.14 (0.03)
Voting 0.40 (0.12) 0.23 (0.05)
Random. Inf. p 0.01 0.04
Age [17.67-18.33] [17.67-18.33] [22.25-23.75] [22.25-23.75]
Method OLS IV OLS IV
Controls X X X X
Observations 332 321 443 443
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01. Constant and country fixed-effects omitted from output.
Model 2 and 4 show the causal average complier effect (CACE) from using the eligibility as
instrument. Bell-McCaffrey bias adjusted robust SE in parentheses. P-values of two-tailed
tests based on randomisation inference (permutation within countries). Inverse probabil-
ity weights accounting for different probabilities of assignment to treatment and control
conditions between country blocks.
the EP contest is large enough to be detected when comparing first-time EP voters to
those who had already been enfranchised in ‘meaningful’ national elections.
Conclusions
Do European Parliament elections socialise young voters into political disaffection or
strengthen party bonds to Eurosceptic parties? In light of the low saliency of the con-
test and challengers’ attempts to mobilise against further integration, scholars have
cautioned against unanticipated or disintegrative consequences of the European elec-
tions. These concerns regard particularly young voters who are suspected of being
most vulnerable to the context of the elections given that they lack prior voting habits
(van der Eijk and Franklin 2009, p. 91).
This study is the first to estimate the causal impact of the EP elections for po-
litical socialisation by relying on a quasi-experimental design that is able to isolate
the socialising effect of the EP elections for adolescents’ interest in politics and their
attachment to challenger parties. Relying on a cross-national European dataset from
2004 that includes six different countries from all three political European regions
(Kriesi 2016), the design exploits the exogenous variation in the precise birthdates of
young individuals. Some of the adolescents happen to come of age in time for the EP
elections while some others happen to reach legal voting age slightly later, creating a
61
natural discontinuity among the adolescents who are otherwise very similar to each
other. In 2004, the issue of European integration had come under spotlight of public
contestation, bringing an end to the ‘permissive consensus’ that had dominated the
previous decades (Hooghe and Marks 2009). At the same time, the elections were
still marked by their second-order nature in bringing about losses for big parties and
gains for small parties (Schmitt 2005). While this study shows that the second-order
contest does not socialise young voters into supporting radical and anti-European par-
ties, it calls for replicating this finding with more recent data. Future research should
use a similar identification strategy to estimate the causal effect of the upcoming EP
elections in 2019, which may see an unprecedented success of challenger parties. This
could help to understand whether the EP elections have a differential socialising effect
in times of a quickly changing European party landscape.
The results of this chapter indicate that the EP elections do not have adverse ef-
fects on the political engagement of young individuals. On the contrary, the results
show that the supranational contest lastingly stimulates first-time voters’ political
interest. The effect of first-time voting in the EP elections is persistent and can be
detected more than five years afterwards. In highlighting the action-induced com-
ponent of preference formation, this study contributes to our understanding of the
relationship between mobilisation and political interest. In the tradition of classical
accounts on participatory democracy holding that individuals ‘do learn to participate
by participating’ (Pateman 1970, p. 105; see also Finkel 1985), scholars have begun to
rethink the causal direction between electoral participation and political sophistica-
tion (Shineman 2018). Research shows evidence that the latter may be an outcome of
being mobilised for an election through, for example, enfranchisement (Wagner et al.
2012; Quintelier and Hooghe 2012; Zeglovits and Zandonella 2013), which is in line
with classical accounts of democratic theory. Finkel (1985) argues that electoral par-
ticipation brings about a greater familiarity and confidence with the election process,
which, in turn, increases the individual sense of political efficacy. This study shows
that even the European second-order elections contribute to inculcate a greater politi-
cal interest in first-time voters, both regarding their general political interest and their
particular curiosity for European politics. In doing so, the EP contest brings about pos-
itive effects for the socialisation of impressionable voters. This positive impact of the
EP elections on arousing young voters’ interest bears crucial relevance as individuals’
level of political interest has been found to be remarkably stable once formed during
early adulthood (Prior 2010). Shedding light on the participatory consequences of the
European elections, the results of this study appear encouraging for proponents of
further European integration.
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Notes
1. Other studies concerned with attitudinal change regarding partisan preferences
due to the act of voting have somewhat circumvented this problem by comparing
previously ineligible and eligible individuals ahead of the next election (Elinder 2012).
This design substantively uncouples measurement from treatment as a full electoral
cycle lies in between both respective points in time.
2. I rely on the potential outcomes framework notation (Rubin 1974) to describe
the causal parameters of interest, invoking the stable unit treatment value (SUTVA)
assumption that an individuals’ treatment condition is not affected by the treatment
condition of others units (no interference). This effect is given by the intent-to-treat
(ITT) estimator: ITT = E[YijZi = 1] E[YijZi = 0], with Yi the potential outcome
we would observe for unit i and Zi measuring the treatment of first-eligibility in the
EP elections.
3. Non-compliance with treatment assignment is one-sided as ineligible individu-
als in the control group are prohibited from receiving the treatment (participation
in the EP election) through the legal eligibility at the age of 18. Thus, always-takers
and defiers do not exist, or formally speaking Di(0) = 0 for all i. I then estimate
the complier average treatment effect (CACE) using instrumental variable regression:
^CACE = E^(YijZi=1) E^(YijZi=0)
E^(DijZi=1) .
4. Formally speaking, only the assignment to treatment is random and determined
by a binary indicator Zi, measuring whether the respondent had reached full age at
the day of the EP elections whileDi(Z) is a binary indicator for the compliance with
the treatment under assignment, or actual voting in the European contest. We can
estimate the effect of voting by instrumenting the endogenous electoral participation
of first-time voters. The ITT estimates (see Table 3.1 column 1 and 2) have a slightly
larger number of observations due to missing values on the endogenous variable of
voting in the EP elections. The ITT estimates correspond to the first stage of the IV
regression and do not change substantivelywhen considering the slightly smaller sam-
ple of the CACE estimates. The instrument is not a weak-instrument (p<0.01), i.e. the
instrument has a sufficient correlation with the endogenous explanatory variable.
5. The EUYOUPART dataset also includes Slovakia and Austria, which are, however,
excluded from the analysis in this study as both countries held another national elec-
tion, namely a presidential election, during the months leading up to the EP elections,
leaving only 10 (Slovakia) and 6 (Austria) treated first-time voters in the sample.
6. Formally, their eligibility is expected to be exogenous to the relevant outcome
variables, (Yi(1);Yi(0)) ? Di, leaving us confident that the variation in treatment
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and control around the cut-off quasi-randomly splits the sample into treatment and
control (Lee and Lemieux 2010, p. 283).
7. Table B.8 in Appendix B shows that the results are robust to genetic optimal
matching, maximising the balance between treatment and control group.
8. All standard errors and confidence intervals for the different point estimates of
the treatment are constructed using the Bell-McCaffrey (BM) bias adjusted robust vari-
ance estimator as recommended by Imbens and Kolesar (2016) taking the small num-
bers of country-clusters into account. The adjustment combines a bias-reduced form
of the cluster robust standard errors with a Satterthwaite approximation for the de-
grees of freedom of the t-distribution, see Imbens and Kolesar (2016) for a detailed
discussion.
9. The small number of individuals in treatment and control groupwithin each coun-
try does not allow for exploring country-specific differences of the effect size.
10. At the same time, the smaller sample size makes it more likely that imbalance
between treatment and control increases by chance. Therefore, the main analysis
relies on a larger bandwidth.
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CHAPTER 4
The Persistence of Anti-Integration Sentiments
Introduction
When Austria decided to join the European Union (EU) in 1994, a large majority of
Austrian citizens endorsed the idea to become part of the supranational integration
project. Asked in a popular referendum whether they would approve of Austria’s ac-
cession to the EU, two out of three Austrians happily wanted to join the EU. There
was, however, also a small minority of Austrians expressing a remarkable opposition
towards the Union. In some Austrian villages, more than eighty percent of voters did
not want their country to become a member state. More than twenty years later, dur-
ing the Austrian election campaign in 2017, the populist radical right Freedom Party
of Austria (FPÖ) spells out what many Austrian citizens truly seem to have at heart
today: ‘The existing competence structure of the EU ought not to be further extended,
it ought to be cut down to a reasonable amount.’ Public opinion, it appears, has shifted
in Austria, testified by the unprecedented levels of mass support for the populist rad-
ical right. Those who used to belong to the early EU enthusiasts seem to have turned
their back against the Union, overtaken by the integration efforts of the elites in Brus-
sels, left out in midst of the technocratic decision-making procedure, left behind in an
increasingly culturally diverse and internationally integrated Austria. The sentiments
that find expression in support for the populist right FPÖ in Austria find expression
66 CHAPTER 4. PERSISTENCE OF ANTI-INTEGRATION SENTIMENTS
in support for the Sweden Democrats in Sweden, for the Front National in France and
for the Law and Justice Party in Poland. Across Europe, it appears, citizens who fear
to lose national control are turning to populist right parties who advocate a defense
of the nation state against the EU (de Vries 2018, p. 151).
With a wave of unprecedented populist right success sweeping across all parts
of Europe, political scientists are trying to grasp the roots of mass support for the
populist right. At the heart of the populist right discourse lies the demand for na-
tional demarcation and the demand for regaining national decision-making power.
With an increasing transfer of policy-making authority to the European Union, the
question of European integration has undoubtedly gained salience within national
political discourse, fostering public contestation around the issue and seemingly fu-
elling the success of anti-European populist right actors. Scholars argue that populist
right demands originate in discontent with the European Union, in grievances born
from a steady growing authority transfer of decision-making power to the EU and
in feelings of loss of national sovereignty (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007; Krouwel and
Abts 2007, p. 268; Serricchio et al. 2013). Frustrated and disenchanted with the tech-
nocratic elites in Brussels who are perceived to deliver cultural and economic benefits
only to parts of the European population (Gabel and Palmer 1995), some of the citizens
‘turn their back’ towards the supranational project (Hobolt and de Vries 2016). They
channel their grievances into support for the populist radical right, who appear suc-
cessful in tapping into citizens’ discontent about the differential benefits of European
integration.
The present chapter adds to the understanding of the relationship between oppo-
sition towards the EU and the rise of the populist right by drawing attention to impor-
tant antecedents of contemporary populist right support: persistent anti-integration
sentiments. Bridging studies on public support for the EU with theories on the persis-
tence of political attitudes, it argues that anti-EU sentiments that find expression in
support for the populist right predate grievances related to the actual breadth and pace
of European integration. These grievances seem to be rooted in a culture of opposition
towards European integration that accounts for contemporary mass support for such
parties that are calling for a return to the nation state. Consider the small Austrian
settlement ofWattenberg, situated in the remoteness of Tyrol somewhere half way be-
tween Innsbruck and Kufstein. In contrast to the overwhelmingmajority of Austrians,
65% of the few hundred inhabitants voted against the proposal to join the referendum
in 1994. During the most recent national election in 2017, the populist right Freedom
Party of Austria (FPÖ) almost came in first inWattenberg, outperforming its own vote
share in almost every single other municipality across the country. Just a little more
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than a one hour drive away from Wattenberg, citizens of Fendels, still part of the
Tyrolean remoteness south-west of Innsbruck, in turn, were extremely favourable of
Austria’s EU accession back in 1994 – the village ranked among the top two percent
of all Austrian municipalities with the lowest share of ‘No’ votes. Is it a mere coinci-
dence that in the most recent national election, in Fendels, the populist radical right
ended up performing worse than in 97 percent of all other Austrian municipalities?
In this chapter, I advance the argument that anti-integration sentiments carry a
persistent character, predate the actual experience of EUmembership and are a strong
predictor of contemporary mass support for radical right parties calling for a return
to national sovereignty. To systematically test this proposition, I create an original
and novel database comprising data of all historical EU accession referenda on the
municipality level and link it to current election outcomes within the same locali-
ties. Leveraging the considerable variation of support for accession to the EU across
municipalities, the analysis shows that initial opposition towards joining the EU is a
strong predictor of contemporary populist right success. Those localities that display
the highest share of populist right support today were the ones voicing their opposi-
tion towards joining the EU most loudly before even becoming part of the integration
project. In highlighting that certain anti-EU sentiments are historically entrenched in
a fundamental opposition towards Europe, the study contributes to a growing body
of literature studying the persistence and the long-run effects of political attitudes.
The chapter proceeds as follows. I first discuss the literature on public support for
the EU and politicisation of European integration, highlighting that many theoretical
accounts attribute popular anti-integration sentiments to popular disapproval of the
breadth and pace of EU integration and to popular discontent with EU-performance
during the multiple crises that the Union has experienced over the last decade. Draw-
ing on theoretical accounts of the long-term persistence of cultural and political atti-
tudes, I propose that contemporary radical right support has historical antecedents in
a fundamental rejection of EU membership that predates citizens’ actual experience
of being part of the EU. I then move to present the original database containing the
locality results of all historical EU referenda and introduce the research design exploit-
ing municipality-level variation within regions. The results show that initial anti-EU
sentiments strongly predict contemporary radical right support, suggesting that they
are rooted in a persistent culture of opposition towards the EU. The findings of this
study, thus, speak to the literature on the persistence of political attitudes. I conclude
by discussing the possible local underpinnings of populist right success.
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Public support for the EU and politicisation of Euro-
pean integration
Earlier studies on popular support for the EU largely departed from the assumption
that most individuals hold stable views on the supranational project which depend
only to a very limited extent on citizens’ actual experience with the supranational
institutions. In absence of a direct experience with the EU and in absence of saliency
of the issue of European integration in domestic discourse (Scheingold 1970, 38ff), in-
stead, citizens’ support or opposition to integration was assumed to be ‘weakly struc-
tured’ (Marks andWilson 2000) and embedded in broader value orientations like their
nationalistic attitudes (Inglehart and Reif 1991, p. 152; Duchesne and Frognier 1995).
European issues, however, became more contested within domestic media and
party discourse (Kriesi 2016; Vliegenthart et al. 2008) in the course of a steadily
progressing level of European integration and with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992
as decisive turning point (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Eichenberg and Dalton 2007).1
Consequently, scholars came to agree that the issue of European integration had be-
come politicised over time and that the period of a prevailing ‘permissive consensus’
(Scheingold 1970) had come to an end (Hooghe and Marks 2009). The mass public
was assumed to have become more attentive and more critical about the continued
integration process, ready to engage in European issue voting to express their
(dis-)approval of the respective policies in the European Parliament direct elections
(van Spanje and de Vreese 2011) or national elections (de Vries 2010) and ready to
evaluate the EU institutions based on their performance and the perceived economic
and cultural (in-)utility derived from EU membership (Boomgaarden, Schuck, et al.
2011).
With the rising saliency of European integration rose the electoral support for
those party actors that are most vehemently advocating the return to the nation state:
the populist radical right. Already in the 1990s, the radical right was the single actor
making the issue of European integration most salient among all party families, mo-
bilising citizens against further EU integration (Kriesi 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2005,
p. 424; Vasilopoulou 2018). With recent landmark successes of radical right actors
across Europe and with the consequential success of UKIP in the 2014 EP elections
triggering the popular referendum on Britain’s membership in the Union (‘Brexit’),
within public and within academic discourse, the suspicion spread that the success of
the radical right accrues also from citizens’ dissatisfaction with the expanding scope
of European integration (Weßels 2007, p. 288; Hobolt and Tilley 2014). A number of
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scholars argue that populist right, nationalistic and anti-European demands for Euro-
pean disintegration originate in discontent with the European Union (Gómez-Reino
and Llamazares 2013; Hernández and Kriesi 2016; Hainsworth 2008), in grievances
born from a steadily growing authority transfer of decision-making power to the EU,
in perceived threats to the national interests (Christin and Trechsel 2002) and in feel-
ings of loss of national identity in face of advancing integration levels (Carey 2002;
de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005; McLaren 2002). The unprecedented high levels of
populist right support in all of the three major socio-politically different European
regions seem to reflect that large parts of the European citizenry have ‘turned their
back’ to the EU (Hobolt and de Vries 2016). The progressing authority transfer to the
EU and the level of European integration seem to have asked ‘too much too soon’
(Eichenberg and Dalton 2007) from citizens. The EU, so the unsettling assertion, has
‘left behind’ some of its citizens who ‘turn against the Union’ (Hobolt and de Vries
2016), frustrated and disenchanted with the technocratic elites in Brussels who de-
liver cultural and economic benefits only to parts of the European population. Pop-
ulist radical right actors seem to benefit from growing levels of popular opposition to
the EU. In possibly having nurtured these anti-European sentiments, the expanding
scope of European integration appears to have contributed to the success of populist
right actors who mobilise against further European integration (Vasilopoulou 2011).
This study aims to contribute to our understanding of the relationship between
growing levels of popular discontent with the European Union and mass support for
the populist right. Drawing on theoretical accounts of the long-term persistence of
cultural and political attitudes, I argue that contemporary radical right support has
deep-seated roots that are embedded in a principal rejection of EUmembership which
predates citizens’ actual experience with the EU. In the following, I review theoretical
explanations concerned with the study of the persistence of political attitudes, deriv-
ing the theoretical expectations to be tested in this chapter.
Persistence of anti-integration attitudes
There is a growing interest within economic history to study and document the per-
sistence of cultural and political attitudes on the local level. Studies show that (quasi-)
exogenously created historical events or shocks that certain geographic areas experi-
enced in the past tend to have long-term legacies on individuals’ attitudes and, more
generally, on social structure within the affected communities. The level of preva-
lent social capital within locally concentrated communities reflects historical events
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like the exposure to free-city-state trade (Guiso et al. 2016) or slave trade (Nunn
and Wantchekon 2011). Fouka and Voth (2016) show that during the Eurozone cri-
sis and the related austerity measures imposed by creditor countries like Germany,
German car sales fell differentially in Greece. The drops were significantly greater
within areas that were affected by German massacres during WWII, suggesting that
feelings of aversion towards Germany had been transmitted intergenerationally and,
once activated during the financial crisis, were responsible for the politically moti-
vated consumer boycott. Voigtländer and Voth (2012) draw attention to the historical
antecedents of local anti-Semitism before the Nazi party seized power. They show
that German localities with the greatest share of anti-Semitic behaviour (electoral be-
haviour, hate crimes, related media consumption) were the same ones that saw peak
levels of violence directed against Jews during medieval times. Radical right-wing
ideology has also been found to be persistent during Germany’s more recent history,
as seen in a strong relationship between the strength of local electoral support for the
populist right ‘Alternative for Germany’ (AfD) and historical vote shares for the Nazi
party (NSDAP) in the 1920s and 1930s (Cantoni et al. 2017).
These findings reflect central assumptions about the evolution of individual belief
systems and processes of political socialisation, which have been subject of many clas-
sical political science accounts (e.g. Converse 1964; Easton 1968). Cultural traits and
political attitudes are directly transmitted from one generation to the next through
family socialisation (vertical transmission), but are also indirectly transmitted via im-
itation and learning processes from individuals’ immediate social environments (hor-
izontal transmission) (Bisin and Verdier 2008; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981). The
transmission of cultural traits contributes to the persistence of norms over long pe-
riods of time, the formation of a collective memory within communities, and the re-
silience of local culture. Their immediate social circumstances substantively impact
on individuals’ political beliefs and behaviours (Zuckerman 2005, p. 26).
I argue that anti-integration sentiments and contemporary support for radical
right parties reflect deeply held political values corresponding to a broader belief sys-
tem favouring nationalism and opposing international integration. Carrying a defen-
sive character (Fitzgerald 2018, p. 26) that tries to shelter it from global and multi-
cultural influences, such a belief system and related type of identity is particularly
prone to being reproduced within a local community by its members and prone to
being even passed on from one generation to the next (Fox et al. 2019). Perceived
existential threats to group identities brought about by social developments like EU
integration trigger negative attitudes towards those social developments, contribut-
ing to an increased motivation to maintain and defend a group identity (Smeekes and
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Table 4.1. Year of EU referendum, year of most recent parliamentary election and initial mini-
mum and maximum share of opposition towards the EU by country
Country Year Opposition
Referendum Election Max Min
Austria 1994 2017 88.6 13.52
Croatia 2013 2016 63.7 15.62
Czech Republic 2003 2017 75.0 0.00
Denmark 1972 2015 55.6 20.01
Estonia 2003 2015 76.1 21.95
Finland 1994 2015 78.2 12.21
Hungary 2003 2018 65.2 0.00
Latvia 2003 2018 84.9 10.59
Lithuania 2003 2016 44.8 1.31
Poland 2003 2015 87.7 8.33
Slovakia 2003 2016 67.2 0.57
Slovenia 2003 2018 59.0 0.00
Sweden 1994 2018 81.8 18.97
Verkuyten 2015). This facilitates the persistence of strong nationalistic belief systems
among those who perceive of European integration as a threat to their identity.
By extension, current levels of mass support for the radical right may not only reflect
disenchantment with the workings of the EU or dissatisfaction with the breadth and
pace of European integration. The sentiments that find expression in a vote for the
radical right may also reflect the prevalence of a persistent nationalistic belief system
that is less open to cultural change or the adoption of a global identity (Arnett 2002). I
contend that anti-integration sentiments carry a persistent character and predate the ac-
tual experience of EU membership. To test this proposition, I assess whether a locally
prevalent initial opposition towards the EU, preceding actual membership, predicts
contemporary mass support for radical right parties.
Data and operationalisation
To test the central proposition of this chapter, I undertake an enormous data collection
effort and create a novel and original database entailing data from all historical EU
accession referenda that have been held by current member states prior to joining the
EU.2 To assess whether anti-European sentiments have a persistent character, I focus
only on accession referenda, which elicit citizens’ hostility towards the EU predating
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Figure 4.1. Distribution of initial opposition towards the EU across countries
their country’s actual membership within and their exposure to the supranational
project. I collect this data on the spatially small level of municipalities, resulting in
a dataset comprised of 23822 observations of 13 EU accession referenda in a period
between 1972 and 2013 (for details see Table C.2 in Appendix C). I link this data to elec-
toral results from the most recent parliamentary elections within the same geographi-
cal areas and leverage the considerable within-regional variation of initial opposition
across municipalities to estimate the effect of persistence. Table 4.1 indicates the year
in which citizens decided about their country’s EU membership in a popular referen-
dum, the year of the most recent parliamentary election and the respective highest
and lowest share of initial opposition towards joining the EU within each country.
As seen in the minimum and maximum share of initial opposition towards the
EU across countries in Table 4.1 and as shown in Figure 4.1, the initial opposition
towards joining the EU is rather differently distributed across countries. The north-
western European countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Sweden) display a greater
variation across municipalities of the ‘No’ vote shares than some of the Eastern Eu-
ropean countries (Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania). Other Eastern European countries,
in turn, do display a remarkable variance across municipalities regarding the level of
opposition to becoming a member state (Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland).3
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Figure 4.2. Deviation of municipality level populist right vote share and initial opposition
towards the EU from respective regional mean.
Thus, while a majority of citizens of all countries voted to join the EU, among some
parts of the electorate, there was already substantial scepticism regarding their na-
tion’s membership prior to becoming part of the European integration project. This
initial hostility towards the EUmay persist until the present day and inter alia account
for highmass support levels of those party actors that most fiercely demand the end of
supranational integration. In the following, I discuss the proposed estimation strategy
to systematically test this hypothesis.
The dataset includes a large number of localities from 13 different countries and
may be the first comparative dataset entailing electoral results on the level of mu-
nicipalities extending to such a broad range of nations. In addition to variation be-
tween the countries in the analysis, there are also large disparities between subna-
tional units within the single countries found even in small countries like Estonia
(Heydemann and Vodička 2017, p. 23-24; Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi 2004). These
may substantially impact the (anti-)European sentiments that citizens hold. Studies
concerned with the geography of the vote document the presence of regional elec-
toral strongholds of certain parties. To account for such regional differences, I rely on
region fixed-effects when estimating the effect of initial opposition towards the EU
on contemporary populist right support, which gives us a lower boundary of any ef-
fect of historically persistent political attitudes. As the analysis leverages the variance
across municipalities regarding their deviation from the specific regional mean of anti-
EU sentiments and populist radical right support, it is less likely to find any effect of
persistence net of these region-specific means. Thus, the analysis effectively makes a
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Figure 4.3. Structure of the data: municipality level and regions (Poland). Standardised raw
data and standardised deviation from the regional mean of initial opposition towards the EU
(region-fixed effects).
comparison betweenmunicipalities located within the same region, as sketched in the
beginning of this chapter with reference to the Austrian localities of Wattenberg and
Fendels both situated in the region of Tyrol. In total, there are 158 different regions
in the dataset and all estimates use robust standard errors clustered at the region to
account for the likely common structure of error terms of municipalities within the
same region. The distribution of both the deviation of contemporary populist right
share from the regional mean and the deviation of initial opposition towards joining
the EU from the respective regional mean resemble a normal distribution (see the
respective kernel densities in Figure 4.2). Figure 4.3 visualises the data structure of
the municipality-level observations for the case of Poland,4 highlighting that most of
the variation of opposition towards the EU between the municipalities comes from
regional differences (left panel). Next, I move to assess the impact that initial hostility
towards joining the EU has on contemporary mass support for the populist radical
right net of regional disparities.
The effect of initial opposition on contemporary rad-
ical right support
Table 4.2 presents the results of the effect of initial opposition towards the EU on con-
temporary populist right success.5 With an increase of one percent in the initial level
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of opposition towards the EU, on average, we observe an increase in almost half a per-
centage point of contemporary support for the radical right (see model 1 in Table 4.2).
Model 3 shows that we find the same substantive effect when standardising the vari-
able with respect to a country’s respective mean. Comparing a municipality which
displayed a one standard deviation higher than average hostility towards the EU to
a municipality within the same region which displayed an average-level initial oppo-
sition, we find that the former municipality offers radical right parties significantly
better chances to succeed in current national elections (by 0.35 standard deviations).
The initial hostility towards the EU also significantly predicts current populist right
support when giving equal weight to each country within the analysis (in addition to
the weights adjusting for the size of the electorate), even though the size of the effect
is slightly smaller (see model 2 and model 4 in Table 4.2). Table C.3 in Appendix C
shows that we draw the same statistical inference when relying on a non-parametric
method to obtain the standard errors (bootstrap). The level of initial hostility towards
the supranational project strongly predicts the electoral prospects of radical right ac-
tors in current national elections. It is worth to emphasise that when including 158
region-dummies in all models (omitted from the output), a substantive share of the
dispersion in the data is reduced, which finds reflection in the high share of explained
variance as indicated in the adjusted R-squared values. As mentioned earlier, this
should make it least likely to find any effect of persistent initial EU hostility on cur-
rent radical right success. The fact that historical anti-integration sentiments prior to
acceding the EU still systematically predict current radical right support, therefore, in-
dicates that those anti-integration sentiments cast a long shadow into the present day
and find their expression in mass support for the radical right.6 Those municipalities
that used to express the strongest opposition towards joining the EU in the first place
are the very same ones that offer the best electoral prospects to radical right actors
today. This finding indicates that anti-European sentiments are entrenched in a funda-
mental rejection of the supranational integration project that predates citizens’ actual
experience with the Union. This is important in highlighting that contemporary pop-
ulist right success does not only originate in citizens’ disapproval of the performance
of the EU during the more recent crises or in citizens’ potential sense of losing their
national identity in face of a politically, economically and culturally rapidly integrat-
ing Europe. Instead, a substantial share of anti-integration sentiments appear to have
a long-term persistent character. This finding contributes to the literature on support
for the EU in emphasising the fact that a relevant portion of those anti-integration
sentiments that manifest themselves in support for the arguably most vehement an-
tagonists of European integration, the radical right, is explained by a pre-existing
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Table 4.2. Effect of initial opposition towards the EU on contemporary populist right support
Populist right support
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No Share 0.41 (0.03) 0.18 (0.04)
No Share (std) 0.35 (0.06) 0.16 (0.05)
Number of Regions 158 158 158 158
Country Weights x X x X
Region FE X X X X
Observations 23,822 23,822 23,822 23,822
Adjusted R2 0.93 0.92 0.55 0.48
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Country weights give equal weight to all countries in the analysis by down-weighting countries
with more observations. Model 3 and model 4 report the estimates after standardising the
variables with respect to country-specific moments. All models report robust standard errors
clustered in regions.
hostility towards the EU. This result shall be highly informative to the literature con-
cerned with the study of popular anti-EU sentiments: it demonstrates that resentment
with the European Union is not only rooted in a frequently asserted failure of the EU
or malperformance of the Union during the more recent crises.
Local foundations of anti-integration sentiments
If it is not a genuine failure of the EU that is responsible for instilling radical right
sentiments across Europe, what are, then, the local underpinnings of radical right sen-
timents across Europe? Providing a conclusive answer to this question appears to be
of great importance to social scientists and policy-makers alike. There are numerous
socio-structural factors that may help to nurture radical right sentiments within local
communities, like the structure of the local economy, the socio-structural marginal-
isation of certain municipalities (Arzheimer, Evans, et al. 2019), the local power of
the church, or even the local strength of civic organisations. Comparative research
in this area is made difficult due to the sparse availability of related data entailing
such indicators on the level of municipalities. It is a surprisingly difficult endeavour
to even obtain electoral data from recent parliamentary elections on the level of mu-
nicipalities, let alone to obtain such electoral data from elections dating back in time.
Existing work concerned with explaining local variation in the level of radical right
success has for this reason, unfortunately, been limited to non-comparative studies,
which, in turn, have been outspokenly inconclusive with respect to the influence of
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local socio-structural and community characteristics on the vote for the radical right
(e.g. Bowyer 2008; Coffé et al. 2007; Fitzgerald and Lawrence 2011; Rydgren and Ruth
2013; Halla et al. 2017).
Offering a comprehensive account of the empirical variation in contemporary
radical right support across municipalities – that simultaneously may account for the
variation in initial EU hostility, is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this chapter.
Research on the antecedents, the socialising factors, agents and contexts of citizens’
opposition towards the EU is still limited (Fox et al. 2019; Boomgaarden, Schuck, et al.
2011), making it difficult to even assess whether a deeply held hostility towards the
EU and current populist radical right support do possibly have the same local under-
pinnings. The findings of this chapter, thus, point to a variety of promising future
avenues of research that investigate the mechanisms that account for the persistence
of anti-integration sentiments. Among those future research avenues, it appears par-
ticularly interesting to study the characteristics of such local contexts, in which the
effect of initial EU hostility on current populist right support is particularly weak or
particularly strong. Relatedly, it seems fruitful to explore the characteristics of such
local contexts, in which initial hostility to the EU is not accompanied with a high
radical right share today and the characteristics of such respective local contexts, in
turn, in which high levels of initial support for EU membership are coupled with a
strong local radical right performance today. In addition, survey panel data could
help to establish the role of the family in possibly transmitting affective values to the
EU across generations. Relying on data from the UK Household Longitudinal Survey,
Fox et al. (2019) find evidence that the family is critical in fostering particular views
towards the EU and in explaining an opposition towards membership. Similarily, Rico
and Jennings (2012) show that place identities are reproduced within the family. Both
findings suggest that a locally prevalent EU-hostile culture persists over time due to
intergenerational transmission.
The precise mechanisms accounting for the persistence of EU hostility need to
be addressed by future research. Importantly, however, contemporary radical right
success has historical roots in an initial rejection of EU membership. This initial rejec-
tion predates a potential later disillusionment with the workings of the EU, a potential
later disenchantment with the supranational project in face of the erosion of national
sovereignty, or a potential later dissatisfaction with the EU in face of its performance
during themore recent crises. Thus, the findings of this chapter do at least suggest that
a local political culture which harbours deep-seated anti-integration sentiments and
opposition towards globalisation or cultural openness is a particularly fertile ground
for the populist radical right.
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Conclusions
With an increasing level of supranational integration and in the course of multiple
crises that the European Union has experienced over the last decade, the issue of Eu-
ropean integration has come under spotlight of political and public debate, heighten-
ing its salience within national political discourse and fostering political contestation
around the issue. With the increasing saliency of the question of European integration
rose also the support for those party actors most vehemently calling for national de-
marcation. Scholars have suggested that the growing populist right demands among
parts of the European electorate reflect a quickly spreading popular discontent with
the European Union, born in grievances about a steadily growing authority transfer
to the supranational institutions and rooted in citizens’ fading support for the EU.The
present chapter, in contrast, draws attention to the antecedents of contemporary pop-
ulist right support: persistent anti-integration sentiments. Building on theories of the
persistence of political attitudes, I contend that anti-EU sentiments predate grievances
related to the actual breadth and pace of European integration, and are instead deeply
entrenched in a resilient local culture of opposition towards European integration.
To systematically test this proposition, I have drawn on an original dataset of
historical municipality-level data that entails information on initial opposition levels
towards joining the supranational project, prior to membership in the EU, and have
linked this dataset to electoral data of the most recent parliamentary elections within
the same geographical units. Exploiting the variation of historical opposition towards
the EU within regions, the findings show that the very same localities that were most
hostile towards the Union before even becoming part of the supranational project
display the highest share of radical right support today.
Anti-integration sentiments appear to be rooted in a principal and affective re-
jection of Europe and in a culture of hostility towards the EU that persists over several
decades. The findings of this chapter, thus, contribute to an emerging strand of litera-
ture studying the longevity and persistence of political attitudes. In drawing attention
to the antecedents of contemporary populist right support, that predate citizens’ pos-
sible disillusionment with the EU in face of the advancing scope of integration and
supranationalisation, the results presented here have important implications for our
understanding of anti-integration sentiments across Europe.
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Notes
1. Others have precisely pointed to the negative result of the Danish referendum
on the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992 (Franklin, Marsh, et al. 1994, p. 456), when the
Danes disapproved of the Treaty in an outspokenly close popular vote.
2. There are two cases that cannot be integrated into the database as the countries
did not count the votes on a level below the electoral districts. These two cases are
Ireland (1972) and Malta (2003). While the analysis cannot even resort to using the
higher aggregated (electoral district level) results because of a large district reform
in the former case, the country used a single constituency for the referendum in the
latter case.
3. To account for these differential distributions of initial opposition towards the
EU across countries, I standardise the variables with respect to their country-specific
moments and report the estimates of both the unstandardized and standardised vari-
ables.
4. The example of Poland is chosen because of data availability of georeferenced data
for Poland. Given that shapefiles are not available for other countries, the analysis,
unfortunately, cannot model the spatial nature of the data and a potential remaining
spatial dependence among municipalities after region fixed-effects.
5. All models account for the different sizes of the respective 23822 observations
by giving more weight to those observations that correspond to a larger share of
the respective electorate. This weighting procedure is useful to avoid that citizens’
voting behaviour within larger municipalities has a smaller impact on the results than
citizens’ voting behaviour within smaller municipalities (Arzheimer and Carter 2009).
6. Placebo-tests show that a strong initial opposition towards joining the EU, in
turn, does not predict contemporary mainstream party success nor populist radical
left success.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion
Has European integration created its own backlash in fuelling the ascendency of those
nationalistic political forces which the European idea exactly aspired to leave behind
as part of its past? This dissertation aids understanding the interplay between the
steadily progressing level of political integration on the European level and the surge
of the radical right across European member states. At the heart of the populist right
discourse lies the demand for national sovereignty and demarcation, the quest to re-
gain national decision-making power in an increasingly globalised world order and
the desire to take back authority over the degree of cultural and ethnic plurality within
the borders of nation states. In the process of a continuous widening and deepening of
the level of supranational integration, the issue of European integration has arguably
gained salience within national political discourse. The full labour market integration
of the Eastern European member states that joined the European Union in 2004 and
2007, the experience of the deep European financial crisis, the recent challenges posed
to the EU by the large influx of asylum seekers, or the outcome of the British refer-
endum on the country’s withdrawal from the Union, have only further put the EU
into spotlight of contestation, exposing the variety of current and future challenges
related to political and economic integration among European member states.
This dissertation has taken on the challenge to understand the complex interplay
between European integration and the surge of the radical right across Europe. The
central argument that I have advanced in this dissertation is that the progressing level
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of European integration has offered populist radical right actors an opportunity to
make their core demands publicly salient and to gain political visibility when mobilis-
ing citizens based on one of their principal causes: the protection of national identity
in times of an ever greater ethnic plurality within European member states and in
times of their ever growing exposure to cultural and economic globalisation. Politi-
cal integration within the EU offers fruitful opportunity structures for radical right
actors to articulate their nationalistic demands that belong to their core ideology, to
attack the technocratic EU policy-making that feeds into their central anti-elitist dis-
course and to capitalise from the institutional feature of European direct elections
that bolsters their national electoral success. The differential extent to which their
mobilisation against the European idea feeds into their national success appears to
be contingent on the level of saliency of Europe in domestic discourse as much as on
pre-existing EU-hostile sentiments among parts of the European citizenry. It appears
that the issue of European integration lends itself very well for the cause of the radical
right in being sufficiently abstract, sufficiently unpoliticised and sufficiently complex
for broad political mobilisation strategies against further integration. These strategies
are successful more because they incite nationalistic sentiments among parts of the
European public than because they reflect the possible negative experiences citizens
have made as being part of the EU or as being voters in the EP elections. The supra-
national contest and voting in the European elections does not socialise young voters
into support for radical right parties that tend to perform well in these markedly dif-
ferent elections. Neither is citizens’ disenchantment with the actual experience in
the EU the main driver of radical right support: the radical right is performing best
within those parts of Europe that were most hostile to the EU before even becom-
ing part of the project. Profiting from the increased salience of questions related to
European integration, the populist radical right is particularly successful in mobilis-
ing deeply entrenched, pre-existing nationalistic and culturally defensive sentiments
among parts of the European electorate who conceive of the European project as an
existential threat to their identity.
To advance these arguments, Chapter 1 laid out the analytical framework for
this dissertation. It departed from the observation that success of radical right actors
has grown with rising levels of contestation around European integration, suggesting
that a growing popular resentment with the EU has contributed to fuel the success of
those nationalistic political forces that the Union initially tried to tame and constrain.
It then argued that to grasp the potential impact of the EU on the rise of the radical
right, it is critical to understand the relevance of anti-European stances for the mo-
bilisation of culturally conservative demands and resulting ideological and discursive
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opportunity structures created for the radical right. A particularly promising institu-
tional opportunity structure for the articulation of nationalistic demands lies in the
European direct elections. To understand the specific character of the institution and
the reasons why the European elections possibly work to fuel the surge of the populist
radical right across member states, chapter 1 situated the European direct elections
by universal suffrage in the history of integration attempts on the one side and in the
scholarly engagement with this institution on the other side. To date, the European
Parliament elections may be the most ambitious institutional invention of European
elites, carrying the greatest ‘in vitro’, experimental character and the largest amount
of imponderability with respect to their effects in actual interaction with those who
were the principal targets of this institution – the European citizens. As early as after
the first round of EP elections in 1979, scholars and policy-makers alike have under-
stood that the real-world performance of the long-aspired European direct elections
by universal suffrage did anything but contribute to creating a ‘citizen’s Europe’ as
their proponents had hoped. Situating this institution in the broader context of inte-
gration efforts, chapter 1 made a case that the institution, by construction, provides
structural conditions that favour the success for the radical right. It also argued that
the institution, thanks to the simultaneous organisation across member states, is par-
ticularly well suited to study the effects that political integration within the European
Union entails for domestic party competition and voting behaviour. This task, how-
ever, has largely been neglected by existing accounts that havemostly been concerned
to understand the character of the European contest more than its resulting conse-
quences. Synthesising these arguments, chapter 1 provided the analytical framework
for the study of the possible effects of political integration within the EU for the surge
of the radical right. Building on this analytical framework, chapter 2 and chapter 3
offered two empirical accounts for understanding such effects of the European elec-
tions with respect to two potential implications that are of great concern for students
of European party politics and political socialisation.
Chapter 2 argued that populist radical right actors gain momentum in EP elec-
tions. Following the seminal work of Reif and Schmitt (1980) and the so-called second-
order elections theory, scholars have extensively studied the character of the supra-
national contest, the voting calculus, and the policy issues involved therein. Less
scholarly effort, however, has been devoted to understand the consequences of the
EP elections which are characterised by a markedly different nature than national
elections. Departing from the notion that both the structurally different party com-
petition and the structurally different voting behaviour in the EP arena may create
repercussions for national electoral outcomes, the chapter posited that the EP elec-
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tions foster challenger parties’ success on the national level. I tested this proposition
by exploiting the variation in national electoral cycles and the quasi-exogenous timing
of EP elections since 1979. The results highlighted that a ‘vote against Europe’, particu-
larly once made visible in European elections, decisively shapes domestic election out-
comes. The supranational contest offers populist radical right actors an opportunity
structure to mobilise voters based on their antagonism towards the elite-consensus on
European integration. By disentangling this momentum effect from alternative expla-
nations, the study established that the impact of EP elections on the national fortune
of the radical right does not only originate in congruent voter preferences across gov-
ernance levels. Instead, the mere event of the EP contest benefits radical right actors
when the national election is close in time. It appears that the EP elections offer an
opportunity structure for the populist right to make their antagonism towards further
integration domestically salient, potentially imperilling the European project.
Chapter 3 investigated another consequence of the EP elections, potentially not
less perilous in nature. It examined the effect of the rather uncompetitive and rather
insalient European contest on political socialisation among adolescents. Asking for
these socialising consequences appears important as the different nature of the elec-
tions may have adverse effects on individuals’ future political engagement, particu-
larly among young and impressionable voters who have not yet been socialised into
voting habits. Relying on a quasi-experimental approach, I identified the causal effect
that first-time eligibility for the EP elections has for political attitudes and behaviour.
The design exploited the exogenous variation in first-time eligibility among respon-
dents of a cross-national youth study from 2004 that includes six different countries
from all major three politically different regions (Kriesi 2016). The study then com-
pared two groups of adolescents in the survey that are indistinguishable from each
other but differ with respect to whether they came of age for the EP elections by mak-
ing use of a precise measure of the birth dates of adolescents. Some of the adolescents
in the survey happened to turn eligible just before the European election day and some
others happened to reach voting age slightly later. Consequently, half had the chance
to participate on election day and cast their first ever vote in the European Parliament
elections, while the other half did not. This creates a natural discontinuity in the data
that could be fruitfully used in the empirical design to capture the effects of first-time
eligibility in the secondary EP elections for political socialisation. The results showed
that the EP elections are not responsible for creating partisan bonds to anti-European
challenger parties among first-time voters. Instead, the findings demonstrated that
the supranational contest lastingly stimulates first-time voters’ political interest. The
estimated effect appeared to be long-lasting and could be detected among respon-
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dents in the dataset more than five years after the time of their first enfranchisement
in the EP elections. The results of this study therefore contribute to understanding
the relationship between political mobilisation and political interest, echoing the no-
tion that the latter may be an outcome of being mobilised for an election through,
for instance, enfranchisement. Thus, the findings reflect central assumptions of clas-
sical democratic theory in showing that even the European second-order elections
contribute to inculcate a greater political interest in first-time voters, regarding both
their general political interest and their particular curiosity for European politics. The
European contest brings about positive effects for the socialisation of impressionable
voters, which seems highly relevant as individuals’ level of political interest has been
found to be remarkably stable once formed during early adulthood (Prior 2010).
In an attempt to understand the origins of anti-integration sentiments across
Europe, chapter 4 demonstrated that contrary to much emphasis in public and aca-
demic discourse, these sentiments are not genuinely rooted in disenchantment with
the workings of the EU, but had already existed before a country became part of the
EU: anti-integration sentiments appear to have a strong affective character in pre-
dating citizens’ actual experience with EU membership. Building on theories of the
historical persistence of political attitudes, I contended that the same anti-EU senti-
ments that prevailed across certain parts of Europe before the breadth and pace of
European integration found their way into citizens’ everyday lives, today, are giving
rise to contemporary mass support for the radical right, the most EU-hostile politi-
cal actors. The issue of European integration did arguably come under spotlight in
the course of supranational integration and in the course of multiple crises that the
European Union has experienced over the last decade. This has not only increased
the salience of European integration, it has also fostered political contestation around
the issue. In parallel to the saliency of European integration rose also the support for
those party actors who most vehemently call for national demarcation. Consequently,
scholars have proposed that the growing populist right demands among wide parts of
European citizens reflect their discontent with the European Union, their grievances
about a steadily growing authority transfer to the supranational institutions and their
fading support for the EU. Building on theories of the persistence of political attitudes
and the longevity of local political culture, I contended, in contrast, that contempo-
rary populist right support has significant antecedents in a hostility towards the EU
that predate a potential later disillusionment with the performance of the European
Union. To systematically test this proposition, I drew on an original and novel dataset
that entails information on initial opposition levels towards joining the supranational
project. To create this dataset, I collected the results from all EU accession referenda
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on the level of municipalities. Leveraging the considerable within-regional variation
of support for accession to the EU across municipalities, the analysis showed that ini-
tial opposition towards the EU is a strong predictor of contemporary populist right
success. Those localities that display the highest share of populist right support today
were the ones voicing their opposition towards joining the EUmost loudly before even
becoming part of the integration project. It appears that anti-integration sentiments
are deeply entrenched in a locally persistent culture of opposition towards European
integration. In stressing the legacy of initial EU hostility, the study contributes to a
nascent literature on the persistence of local culture.
In synthesis, the dissertation provides an empirical approach to the relationship
between two major current transformations of social reality – European integration
and the surge of the radical right, aiding the understanding of the interplay between
them through the lenses of political behaviour, political sociology, political commu-
nication and political psychology. Grasping the potential effects that political inte-
gration within the EU had for the surge of the radical right, while unintended, yet
potentially conducive to its rise in nature, appears critical as to comprehend to which
extent the European idea has fuelled those nationalistic sentiments that it aspired to
leave behind as part of its past. The results of the different studies suggest that po-
litical integration within the European Union and the surge of the radical right are
to be understood as elements of larger, structural transformations of European soci-
eties that are sustained and promoted by processes of globalisation. The increasing
level of contention around the issue of European integration acts as fertile ground for
the populist radical right, helping to activate nationalistic and EU-hostile sentiments
among parts of the European public.
APPENDIXA
Supplementary Material: Do European Parliament
Elections Foster Challenger Parties Success on the
National Level?
A.1 Parties in the analysis
Table A.1. Parties in the analysis
Country Party Abbr.
Populist Radical Left
Austria Communist Party of Austria KPÖ
Belgium Communist Party KPB-PCB
Belgium Workers’ Party of Belgium PA-PTB
Cyprus Progressive Party of Working People AKEL
Czech Republic Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia KSCM
Germany Peace alliance Fr
Germany The Left / PDS Li/PDS
Denmark Left Socialists VS
Denmark People’s Movement against the EU Fobe
Denmark Communist Party of Denmark DKP
Denmark Common Course FK
Denmark Red-Green Alliance En-O
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Table A.1. Parties in the analysis (continued)
Country Party Abbr.
Spain United Left IU|PCE
Spain United People HB
Spain Workers’ Party of Spain PTE-UC
Spain Galician Nationalist Block BNG
Spain Podemos P
Spain It is time EeM
Spain In Tide EM
Spain In Common We Can ECP
Finland Democratic Union | Left Alliance DL|VAS
Finland Communist Party of Finland SKP-Y
France Workers’ Struggle LO
France Party of Presidential Majority MP
France Citizens’ Movement MDC
France Revolutionary Communist League LCR
Greece Communist Party of Greece KKE
Greece Democratic Social Movement DIKKI
Greece Coalition of the Radical Left SYRIZA
Greece Front of the Greek Anticapitalist Left AASA
Greece Popular Unity LE
Hungary Hungarian Workers’ Party MMP
Ireland Sinn Fein The Workers’ Party SFWP
Ireland Democratic Left DLP
Ireland Socialist Party SP
Ireland United Left Alliance ULA
Ireland People Before Profit Alliance PBPA
Italy Proletarian Democracy DP
Italy Communist Refoundation Party PRC
Italy Party of the Italian Communists PdCI
Italy Left (Ecology) Freedom SL
Italy Anticapitalist List LA
Italy Five Star Movement M5S
Italy Civil Revolution RC
Lithuania Socialist People’s Front SPF
Luxembourg Communist Party of Luxembourg KPL
Luxembourg The Left DL
Latvia Socialist Party of Latvia LSP
Latvia For Human Rights in a United Latvia PCTVL
Netherlands Communist Party of the Netherlands CPN
Netherlands Pacifist Socialist Party PSP
Netherlands Socialist Party SP
Portugal Popular Democratic Union UDP
Portugal Unified Democratic Coalition CDU
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Table A.1. Parties in the analysis (continued)
Country Party Abbr.
Portugal Revolutionary Socialist Party PSR
Portugal Communist Party of the Portuguese Workers PCTP/MRPP
Portugal Bloc of the Left BE
Slovakia Communist Party of Slovakia KSS
Slovakia 99 Percent – Civic Voice .99
Slovakia Law and Justice PaS
Slovenia United Left ZdLe
Sweden Left Party V
United Kingdom Sinn Fein SF
Green Parties
Austria The Greens – The Green Alternative Gruene
Belgium Confederated Ecologists Ecolo
Belgium Agalev – Green AGL-Gr
Cyprus Ecological and Environmental Movement KOP
Czech Republic Green Party SZ
Denmark Socialist Peoples Party SF
Denmark Greens Gron
Denmark The Alternative A
Estonia Estonian Greens EER
Finland Green League VIHR
Finland Ecological Party Eko
France Greens V
France Ecology Generation GE
Germany Alliance 90 / Greens B90/Gru
Greece Alternative Ecologists OE
Greece Ecologist Greens OP
Hungary Politics Can Be Different LMP
Ireland Green Party Green
Italy Green Lists FdLV
Italy Rainbow Greens VA
Italy Federation of the Greens FdV
Latvia Green and Farmers’ Union ZZS
Luxembourg The Greens Greng
Luxembourg Green Left Ecological Initiative GLEI
Luxembourg Green Alternative GAP
Malta Democratic Alternative AD
Netherlands Radical Political Party PPR
Netherlands GreenLeft GL
Netherlands The Greens Groen
Portugal Party for Animals and Nature PAN
Portugal Earth Party MPT
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Table A.1. Parties in the analysis (continued)
Country Party Abbr.
Slovakia Green Party SZS
Slovenia Youth Party of Slovenia SMS
Spain Greens Ecologists LVE
Spain Confederation of the Greens CV
Sweden Greens MP
United Kingdom Green Party GP
Populist Radical Right
Austria Freedom Party of Austria FPÖ
Austria Alliance for the Future of Austria BZÖ
Belgium National Front FN
Belgium Flemish Block VB
Bulgaria Attack Ataka
Bulgaria National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria NFSB
Bulgaria IMRO – Bulgarian National Movement VMRO
Cyprus National Popular Front ELAM
Czech Republic Workers’ Party of Social Justice DSSS
Czech Republic Sovereignty – Jana Bobosikova Bloc S-JB
Denmark Danish Peoples Party DF
Estonia Future Estonia | Independence TEE
France National Front FN
France National Republican Movement MNR
Germany The Republicans Rep
Germany German People’s Union DVU
Germany National Democratic Party NPD
Germany Alternative for Germany AfD
Greece Popular Orthodox Rally LAOS
Greece Independent Greeks AE
Greece Golden Dawn LS-CA
Hungary Hungarian Justice and Life Party MIEP
Hungary Jobbik Movement Jobbik
Italy Fiamma Tricolore MSFT
Italy North League LN
Latvia For Fatherland and Freedom NA/TB/LNNK
Latvia All For Latvia! VL
Lithuania Young Lithuania JL
Luxembourg National Movement NB
Luxembourg Alternative Democratic Reform Party AR|ADR
Netherlands Centre Democrats CD
Netherlands Centre Party CP
Netherlands Party for Freedom PVV
Poland League of Polish Families LPR
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Table A.1. Parties in the analysis (continued)
Country Party Abbr.
Romania Greater Romania Party PRM
Slovakia Slovak National Party SNS
Slovenia Slovenian National Party SNS
Sweden Sweden Democrats SD
United Kingdom British National Party BNP
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A.2 Empirical extensions
Descriptive statistics and marginal effects
Table A.2. Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean SD. p25 p50 p75 Min. Max.
National Vote (Radical Left) 174 5.84 7.82 0.49 3.33 8.21 0 43.87
EP Vote (Radical Left) 174 6.64 7.65 0 4.62 9.30 0 34.90
Prev. Government (Radical Left) 174 0.01 0.11 0 0 0 0 1
National Vote (Green) 174 4.08 4.45 0 2 7.30 0 20.11
EP Vote (Green) 174 5.13 5.07 0 3.49 9.05 0 19.91
Prev. Government (Green) 174 0.06 0.23 0 0 0 0 1
National Vote (Radical Right) 174 4.52 6.16 0 1.18 8.64 0 28.24
EP Vote (Radical Right) 174 4.22 5.97 0 1.09 6.80 0 29.82
Prev. Government (Radical Right) 174 0.05 0.22 0 0 0 0 1
EP Electoral Cycle 174 0.44 0.28 0.19 0.45 0.66 0 0.98
EP District Magnitude (Log.) 174 2.78 0.96 2.08 2.77 3.22 0 4.60
EP Threshold 174 1.81 2.26 0 0 5.00 0 5.80
District Magnitude (Log.) 174 2.24 1.18 1.69 2.31 2.71 0 5.01
Number of Country’s EP Elections 174 3.56 2.12 2 3 5 1 8
Midterm EP Elections 174 0.32 0.47 0 0 1 0 1
Unemployment 174 8.97 4.68 5.98 7.90 10.43 0.72 25.00
1st EP Decade 174 0.17 0.38 0 0 1 0 1
2nd EP Decade 174 0.20 0.40 0 0 1 0 1
3rd EP Decade 174 0.31 0.46 0 0 1 0 1
4th EP Decade 174 0.32 0.47 0 0 1 0 1
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Table A.3. Marginal effects of vote share in EP elections on national vote share conditional on
EP electoral cycle
Populist Radical Left Green Parties Populist Radical Right
Cycle Linear Linear Quadratic
0 0.636 0.377 0.905
[0.483; 0.789] [0.218; 0.537] [0.645; 1.165]
0.1 0.595 0.356 0.698
[0.456; 0.734] [0.209; 0.504] [0.521; 0.875]
0.2 0.554 0.335 0.536
[0.425; 0.682] [0.198; 0.472] [0.393; 0.68]
0.3 0.512 0.315 0.421
[0.39; 0.635] [0.185; 0.444] [0.276; 0.565]
0.4 0.471 0.294 0.351
[0.35; 0.592] [0.17; 0.417] [0.198; 0.504]
0.5 0.43 0.273 0.328
[0.305; 0.556] [0.151; 0.394] [0.174; 0.482]
0.6 0.389 0.252 0.35
[0.255; 0.524] [0.13; 0.374] [0.199; 0.501]
0.7 0.348 0.231 0.418
[0.2; 0.495] [0.105; 0.357] [0.254; 0.582]
0.8 0.307 0.21 0.532
[0.143; 0.47] [0.077; 0.343] [0.317; 0.748]
0.9 0.266 0.189 0.692
[0.084; 0.447] [0.047; 0.331] [0.379; 1.005]
BIC 901.136 730.484 936.139
Table A.3 displays the marginal effect of the European vote share conditional on the
exact position within the European cycle (in distances of 0.1, which corresponds to
roughly half a year), starting from concurrent EP and national elections (cycle=0) to
the occurrence of national elections right before the next EP election at the very end of
the cycle (cycle=0.9). As the marginal effect of interest (EP vote share on the national
vote share @Y@X ) and its standard error is conditional on the position within the cycle
(C)1, the table also reports the confidence intervals around the point estimates.
Semi-parametric kernel smoothed varying coefficient models
The semi-parametric estimates result from a series of locally linear regression using
kernel re-weighting based on the distance between each value of the cycle (the mod-
erator) and each evaluation point as suggested by Hainmueller et al. (2016). The fol-
lowing figures present smooth marginal effects of the treatment (EP vote share) on
the outcome variable with respect to the position in the electoral cycle that are in-
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Figure A.1. Semi-parametric estimates of marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on
national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (populist radical left parties)
dependent from any functional specification of the moderating variable. The band-
width is obtained by using a 5-fold cross-validation procedure, while standard errors
and confidence intervals are computed using a bootstrap. Moreover, the plot shows
a histogram at the bottom of the figure to help readers assess the common support
assumption based on the distribution of the moderator.
Figure A.5 shows a vice versa placebo-test predicting the success of radical right
parties in the European election (dependent variable) conditional on the interaction
between temporal distance to the last national election and the respective electoral
result.
Alternative model specifications
The following tables present the alternativemodel specifications discussed in themain
text of chapter 2.
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Table A.4. Placebo test: fixed-effects regression results of vote share in national election on
EP vote share conditional on national electoral cycle
Placebo: Populist Radical Right
National Vote 0.587***
(0.131)
National Cycle 0.974
(1.613)
National Vote  National Cycle 0.215
(0.202)
Government at EP election -6.796***
(2.214)
Midterm EP -0.168
(0.817)
Unemployment -0.034
(0.124)
EP Elections Participated 0.841
(0.672)
EP Threshold -0.051
(0.513)
National District Magnitude -0.875
(1.494)
European District Magnitude -0.340
(0.960)
p-Wald test (LIE) 0.428
Decade Fixed-Effects X
Robustness of Non-Significance of Interaction Term
Cluster Robust SE X
Pairs Cluster Bootstrapped SE X
Jackknife Parties X
Party Fixed-Effects X
BIC 827.667
N 147
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Table A.5. Fixed-effects regression results of vote share in EP elections on national vote share
conditional on EP electoral cycle (alternative model specifications I)
(1) (2)
Inclusion
of Populist
Radical Right
Correlates
Inclusion of
Contested Pop.
Radical Right
Parties
EP Vote 0.926*** 0.848***
(0.137) (0.149)
Cycle 0.993 5.028
(4.896) (5.494)
Cycle2 -2.373*** -2.308***
(0.668) (0.753)
EP Vote  Cycle 1.889 -3.002
(5.183) (5.802)
EP Vote  Cycle2 2.381*** 2.354***
(0.752) (0.844)
Government at EP election 2.565 2.158
(1.682) (1.902)
Midterm EP 1.360* 0.744
(0.739) (0.833)
Unemployment 0.239** 0.239**
(0.099) (0.103)
EP Elections Participated 0.351 0.408
(0.550) (0.618)
EP Threshold -0.589 -0.619
(0.573) (0.634)
National District Magnitude 0.936 0.812
(1.096) (1.216)
European District Magnitude -0.140 -0.827
(0.914) (1.006)
Number of Asylum Applications (in 1000) -0.014
(0.019)
Turnout -0.051
(0.078)
L-R Position of Mainstream Conserv. Competitor 0.091
(0.437)
p-value Wald Test (LIE) 0.001 0.002
Decade Fixed-Effects X X
BIC 950.365 981.975
N 174 174
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Model 1 includes correlates of
populist right success that might affect the parties’ electoral success on both governance levels
simultaneously, namely the influx of asylum seekers, the turnout rate in a given election, or po-
tential party-strategic advantages for radical right parties determined by the left-right position
of the largest conservative mainstream competitor. Model 2 includes parties that have been clas-
sified as populist radical right parties by some authors but not by others, namely the Dutch List
Pim Fortyn, the British United Kingdom Independence Party, and the True Finns.
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Figure A.2. Semi-parametric estimates of marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on
national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (Green parties)
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Figure A.3. Semi-parametric estimates of marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on
national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (populist radical right parties)
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Figure A.4. Placebo test: binning estimates of marginal effect of vote share in national election
on EP vote share conditional on national electoral cycle (populist radical right parties)
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Figure A.5. Placebo test: marginal effect of vote share in national election on EP vote share
conditional on national electoral cycle (populist radical right parties)
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APPENDIXB
Supplementary Material: The Effect of European
Parliament Elections on Political Socialisation
Table B.1 lists the countries in the analysis along with the total number of adolescents
and those treated, i.e. those who were eligible for the EP elections 2004. It also reports
the mean and standard deviation of political interest by country. The EUYOUPART
survey includes also Austria and Slovakia. As both countries held another state-wide
election closely before the EP contest (presidential elections on 3 April 2004 in Slo-
vakia and on 25 April 2004 in Austria), there are too few respondents left that came of
age for the EP elections (10 respondents in Slovakia and 6 in Austria). Consequently,
the analysis does not include both countries.
B.1 Countries and parties in the analysis
Countries and parties in the analysis
The EUYOUPART survey provides a measure of adolescents’ partisan attachment to
all significant parties within a country that competed for votes in the EP elections 2004
and/or the respective last national election within each country. Young individuals
were asked: ‘How close or distant do you feel to each of the following parties?’. The
classification of parties for the analysis follows expert surveys as integrated in the
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Table B.1. Descriptive statistics of political interest across countries
Country N Eligible Mean Pol. Interest SD Pol. Interest
Estonia 126 52 2.25 0.64
Finland 130 62 2.25 0.75
France 103 47 2.17 0.93
Germany 169 85 2.47 0.77
Italy 116 56 2.48 0.80
United Kingdom 103 54 1.90 0.76
ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2018). Anti-European parties are all parties
that are classified with values below 4, on the scale from 1-10. If there are two or
more parties of the same party family within one country, I consider the respective
party that is closest to an individual.
Table B.2. Parties in the analysis
Country Party Abbr.
Populist Radical Left
Finland Democratic Union | Left Alliance DL|VAS
France French Communist Party PCF
France Citizens’ Movement MDC
France Revolutionary Communist League LCR
Germany The Left / PDS Li/PDS
Italy Proletarian Democracy DP
Italy Communist Refoundation Party PRC
Italy Party of the Italian Communists PdCI
United King-
dom
Respect – The Unity Coalition R
Green Parties
Finland Green League VIHR
France Greens V
Germany Alliance 90 / Greens B90/Gru
Italy Federation of the Greens FdV
United King-
dom
Green Party GP
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Table B.2. Parties in the analysis (continued)
Country Party Abbr.
Populist Radical Right
Finland Finnish Party – True Finns TF
France National Front FN
Germany National Democratic Party NPD
Italy North League LN
United King-
dom
United Kingdom Independence Party UKIP
Anti-EU
Finland Christian Democrats CD
Finland Finnish Party – True Finns TF
France French Communist Party PCF
France Citizens’ Movement MDC
France Revolutionary Communist League LCR
France National Front FN
France Hunting, Fishing, Nature and Tradition CPNT
Germany National Democratic Party NPD
Italy North League LN
Italy Communist Refoundation Party PRC
United King-
dom
Conservatives T
United King-
dom
United Kingdom Independence Party UKIP
B.2 Empirical extensions
Interest in European politics
Table B.5 shows the effect of first-time EP eligibility (model 1 and 2) and first-time EP
voting (model 3 and 4) on European political interest of young respondents.
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Table B.3. Descriptive statistics of covariates
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Eligibile 747 0.48 0.50 0 1
Political Interest 747 2.28 0.79 1 4
European Political Interest 747 2.25 0.82 1 4
Voted in EP 698 0.22 0.41 0 1
Closeness Radical Left 524 2.37 1.11 1 5
Closeness Green Parties 533 2.67 1.13 1 5
Closeness Populist Right 533 1.91 1.06 1 5
Closeness Anti-EU Parties 546 2.36 1.18 1 5
Gender 747 0.52 0.50 0 1
Urban-Rural 747 2.88 1.09 1 5
Standard of Living 747 3.19 0.71 1 5
Religiousness 747 3.05 0.93 1 4
Higher Education Parents 747 2.69 0.99 1 4
Household with Parents 747 0.87 0.33 0 1
Education 747 0.79 0.40 0 1
Voting Habits Parents 747 4.22 1.15 1 5
Political Interest Parents 747 2.69 0.76 1 4
Civic Engagement in School 747 1.86 1.61 0 6
Estonia 747 0.17 0.37 0 1
Finland 747 0.17 0.38 0 1
France 747 0.14 0.35 0 1
Germany 747 0.23 0.42 0 1
Italy 747 0.16 0.36 0 1
United Kingdom 747 0.14 0.35 0 1
Selective attrition
As discussed in the main text of chapter 3, the quasi-experimental design should not
be affected by differential attrition in the survey, i.e. the treatment condition of adoles-
cents in the sample should not affect their likelihood to participate or respond to the
survey (Mutz et al. 2019). To corroborate this assumption, I visualise the distribution
of respondents who come of age in the year of the EP elections (and either receive
the treatment or control condition) along with the distribution of respondents that
came of age in other years covered in the study and are not affected by the treatment
conditions (see Figure B.1). Visualising the deviation from the expected value of the
number of respondents born in each month, we find that there is some seasonality in
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Table B.4. Balance statistics between EP eligibles and EP ineligibles
Control Treatment Diff. in Means Std. Diff.
Urbanisation 2.89 2.84 -0.05 -0.05
Gender 0.50 0.55 0.05 0.11
Standard of Living 3.21 3.16 -0.05 -0.07
Religiousness 3.07 3.04 -0.03 -0.04
Parents’ Higher Education 2.68 2.66 -0.02 -0.02
Living with Parents 0.90 0.83 -0.07 -0.21 **
Education 0.81 0.77 -0.04 -0.09
Voting Habit of Parents 4.35 4.06 -0.29 -0.25 ***
Political Interest of Parents 2.67 2.64 -0.04 -0.05
Civic Engagement in School 1.81 1.79 -0.02 -0.01
Observations 391 356
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01. Tests for conditional independence of the treatment vari-
able and the covariates within strata. Standardized differences in means stratified by
countries.
themonths of birth asmore respondents reach full age during summermonths. Impor-
tantly, however, the mean deviations from the expected value between the analysed
quasi-random group of individuals in the study and individuals born in other years
are not statistically different from each other (see Figure B.1). This leaves us confident
that the treatment or control condition did not prompt a differential attrition in the
study and individuals’ likelihood to participate in the survey was not affected by their
treatment.
Relative age effect
A number of studies in sociology and sports studies have documented that individu-
als who are born in the winter months of a year are less likely to perform as well in
various disciplines as their peers who have been born in summer months (I would like
to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing to this literature). Given that the EP
elections are held in June, and the main study relies on bandwidths of nine months
while excluding the month of the EP elections (June), the sample of treatment first-
time voters includes the month of July, August, September, October, November, De-
cember, January, February, March, while the sample of control individuals consists
of the birth months of September, October, November, December, January, February,
March, April, May. Thus, for the share of 7/9 of all months included in the study,
treatment and control condition are identical. The only difference between the set of
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Table B.5. Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting on European interest in politics
Dependent variable: European political interest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eligible 0.09 (0.03) 0.10 (0.03)
Voting 0.19 (0.11) 0.20 (0.11)
Random. Inf. (p-value) 0.098 0.072
Age [17.25-18.75] [17.25-18.75] [17.25-18.75] [17.25-18.75]
Method OLS OLS IV IV
Controls x X x X
Observations 747 747 698 698
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01. Constant and country fixed-effects omitted from output. Model
3 and 4 show the causal average complier effect (CACE) from using the eligibility as instrument.
Bell-McCaffrey bias adjusted robust SE in parentheses. P-values of two-tailed tests based on ran-
domisation inference (permutation within countries). Inverse probability weights accounting
for different probabilities of assignment to treatment and control conditions between country
blocks.
months included in the treatment and control group relates to the fact that a fraction
of the treated young individuals are born in July/August, while a fraction of the con-
trol young individuals are born in April/ May (all other birth months are represented
both in treatment and control group).
Should this difference relate to unobserved characteristics between treatment
and control individuals that could account for the higher level of political interest in
the treatment group, wewould find the same effectwhen analysing fictive EP elections
in the non-EP years included in the study. The respective placebo test (see Table 3.3
in chapter 3 and Figure B.2) shows that this is not the case. The same sets of birth
months for placebo-treatment and placebo-control respondents in the respective non-
EP years covered in the EUYOUPART study do not yield the same results. The same
holds for analysing a potential similar difference regarding European political interest,
see Table B.6.
Placebo EP elections
Figure B.2 graphically visualises the different coefficients of the ITT and the CACE
estimates presented in Table 3.3 in chapter 3. As can be seen in Figure B.2, none of the
fictive EP elections has a significant positive impact on young individuals’ interest in
politics. Should the greater level of political interest among first-time EP voters only
arise out of the fact that those young individuals are slightly older than their ineligible
counterparts, we should, however, detect a statistically significant difference when
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Figure B.1. Mean deviation of actual number of respondents coming of age from expected
value
analysing these placebo EP elections. The ITT and CACE estimate from the actual EP
elections is also substantively larger in size (0.12 and 0.24, respectively).
Table B.6. Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting in placebo EP years on interest in Euro-
pean politics
Dependent variable: European political interest
2000 2001 2002 2003 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Eligible (OLS) 0.05 (0.06)  0.01 (0.04)  0.005 (0.05) 0.03 (0.03) 0.05 (0.05)
Voting (IV) 0.10 (0.18)  0.03 (0.15)  0.001 (0.14) 0.05 (0.12) 0.10 (0.11)
Controls X X X X X
Observations 798 814 870 895 1,018
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01. Constant and country-fixed effects omitted from output. Bell-
McCaffrey bias adjusted robust SE in parentheses. Inverse probability weights accounting
for different probabilities of assignment to treatment and control conditions between country
blocks. Entries of eligibility present ITT estimates, entries of voting present CACE estimates.
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Figure B.2. Coefficient plot of effect of first-time placebo EP eligibility and voting on interest
in politics
Effects across bandwidths
Table B.7 shows that the findings are robust across other bandwidths around the cut-
off.
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Table B.8. Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting on interest in politics (matched dataset)
Dependent variable: political interest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eligible 0.11 (0.03) 0.12 (0.02)
Voting 0.40 (0.22) 0.36 (0.16)
Random. Inf. (p-value) 0.048 0.034
Age [17.25-18.75] [17.25-18.75] [17.25-18.75] [17.25-18.75]
Method OLS OLS IV IV
Controls x X x X
Observations 736 736 630 630
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01. Constant and country fixed-effects omitted from output. Model
3 and 4 show the causal average complier effect (CACE) from using the eligibility as instrument.
Bell-McCaffrey bias adjusted robust SE in parentheses. Inverse probability weights accounting
for different probabilities of assignment to treatment and control conditions between country
blocks.
Genetic optimal matching
I use a genetic optimal matching procedure (Diamond and Sekhon 2013) to maximise
balance between the treatment and control units on those characteristics that may sys-
tematically relate to both the treatment variable (eligibility for the EP elections) and
the outcome variable (political interest). In contrast to a simple multivariate regres-
sion, this approach has the advantage that we control for any differences between the
groups in a non-parametric way. Hence, we do not need to specify how observable
control covariates relate to the outcome (functional form) and, thus, avoid potential
bias due to model dependence. I perform one-to-one matching as to obtain a control
group of individuals that mirrors the treatment group in size. Table B.8 show the
estimate for the ITT and the CACE on the matched data.
Alternative classification of challenger parties
As to make sure that the results are not sensitive to the party classification used in the
main analysis, Table B.9 presents the respective effect of the EP elections on young
voters’ attachment to challenger parties according to three different classifications,
namely parties thatwere not in government parties at the time of the 2004 EP elections,
small parties that achieved less than ten percentage of the popular vote and small
parties that were not among the two biggest parties. This classification corresponds
to the one used in Dinas and Riera (2018).
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Table B.9. Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting on partisan ties to challenger parties
(alternative classification of challenger parties)
Dependent variable: closeness to challenger parties
Non-Government Parties Small Parties I Small Parties II
(1) (2) (3)
Eligible (OLS) 0.06 (0.05) 0.02 (0.07) 0.02 (0.05)
Voting (IV) 0.11 (0.15) 0.03 (0.21) 0.04 (0.15)
Random. Inf. (p-value) 0.43 0.866 0.824
Age [17.25-18.75] [17.25-18.75] [17.25-18.75]
Controls X X X
Observations 650 648 651
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01. Constant and country-fixed effects omitted from output. Bell-
McCaffrey bias adjusted robust SE in parentheses. Inverse probability weights accounting
for different probabilities of assignment to treatment and control conditions between country
blocks. Entries of eligibility present ITT estimates, entries of voting present CACE estimates.
Non-government parties are all parties who were not in government at the time of the EP elec-
tion, Small I includes all parties with less than 10 percent of the popular vote while Small II
includes all parties that were not one of the two biggest parties as operationalised in Dinas and
Riera (2018).
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C.1 Populist radical right parties across countries
Table C.1 lists the different populist radical right actors that have contested the re-
spective most recent parliamentary election within each country as reported in Table
4.1 in chapter 4.
Table C.1. Populist radical right parties across countries
Name of the party Country
EU Exit Party Austria
Freedom Party of Austria Austria
Autochthonous Croatian Party of Rights Croatia
Croatian Party of Rights 1861 Croatia
HDSSB Coalition Croatia
Homeland Coalition Croatia
Shift Coalition Croatia
Freedom and Direct Democracy Czech Republic
Party of Common Sense Czech Republic
Workers’ Party of Social Justice Czech Republic
Estonian Independence Party Estonia
Finns Party Finland
All for Latvia Latvia
Latvian Nationalists Latvia
Ricibas Party Latvia
Who owns the state Latvia
Lithuanian People’s Party Lithuania
Order and Justice Lithuania
Fidesz Hungary
Hungarian Justice and Life Party Hungary
Jobbik Hungary
Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic Poland
Law and Justice Poland
Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia Slovakia
Slovak National Party Slovakia
Forward Slovenia Slovenia
Slovenian Democratic Party Slovenia
Slovenian National Party Slovenia
United Slovenia Slovenia
The Sweden Democrats Sweden
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C.2 Empirical extensions
Municipalities and regions across countries
Table C.2 lists the number of regions within each country that are included in the
dataset, the absolute number of votes cast within each country in the most recent
parliamentary election, the relative share that these votes correspond to among all
votes in the dataset, and the number of municipality observations per country.
Table C.2. Number of regions and number of votes per country
Country No. of regions Total votes (in mill.) Total votes (in %) Observations
Austria 9 4.232 8.35 2069
Croatia 20 1.505 2.97 553
Czech Republic 14 4.686 9.24 6294
Denmark 5 3.560 7.02 99
Estonia 5 0.574 1.13 220
Finland 13 2.968 5.85 317
Hungary 20 5.564 10.97 3166
Latvia 5 0.818 1.61 517
Lithuania 10 1.222 2.41 1950
Poland 16 15.595 30.75 2478
Slovakia 8 2.646 5.22 2919
Slovenia 12 0.819 1.61 2952
Sweden 21 6.517 12.85 288
Total 158 50.705 100.00 23822
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Bootstrapped standard errors
I use the bootstrap to build a model of the sampling distribution. By treating the
observed municipalities as population from which we resample 1000 times, we obtain
the bootstrapped standard errors for the effect of the initial opposition towards the
EU on contemporary mass support for the populist right. Table C.3 shows that we
draw the statistical inference when relying on non-parametric assumptions about the
sampling distribution.
Table C.3. Effect of initial opposition towards the EU on contemporary populist right support
(bootstrap)
Populist right support
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No Share 0.41 (0.04) 0.18 (0.04)
No Share (std) 0.35 (0.06) 0.16 (0.06)
Number of Regions 158 158 158 158
Country Weights x X x X
Region FE X X X X
Observations 23,822 23,822 23,822 23,822
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Country weights give equal weight to all countries in the analysis by down-weighting countries
with more observations. Model 3 and model 4 report the estimates after standardising the
variables with respect to country-specific moments. All models report robust standard errors
clustered in regions.
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